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The​ ​US​ ​has​ ​pursued​ ​ineffective​ ​foreign​ ​policies​ ​toward​ ​some​ ​countries​ ​for​ ​decades.​ ​In 
other​ ​cases,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​has​ ​changed​ ​foreign​ ​policies​ ​frequently​ ​or​ ​reversed​ ​policies​ ​quickly,​ ​even 
before​ ​allowing​ ​the​ ​chance​ ​to​ ​see​ ​the​ ​policy​ ​come​ ​into​ ​fruition.​ ​North​ ​Korean​ ​policy​ ​and​ ​the 
global​ ​gag​ ​rule​ ​represent​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policies​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​change​ ​depending​ ​on​ ​the​ ​political​ ​party 
of​ ​the​ ​president.​ ​By​ ​contrast,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​foreign​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​seem​ ​impossible​ ​to​ ​alter​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the 
president​ ​desires​ ​a​ ​change​ ​of​ ​course,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​US​ ​commitment​ ​to​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Cuban 
embargo.​ ​Policies​ ​that​ ​sever​ ​and​ ​normalize​ ​diplomatic​ ​relations​ ​are​ ​significant​ ​because​ ​they 
impact​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​population​ ​of​ ​a​ ​targeted​ ​country.​ ​What​ ​broader​ ​policy​ ​goals​ ​can​ ​explain​ ​major 
shifts​ ​in ​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policies,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​severing​ ​or​ ​normalizing​ ​bilateral​ ​relations?​ ​What​ ​drives​ ​the 
US​ ​to​ ​change​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of​ ​its​ ​foreign​ ​policy,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​conditions​ ​must​ ​exist​ ​for​ ​changes​ ​to 
occur?​ ​During​ ​the​ ​Cold​ ​War,​ ​the​ ​answers​ ​to​ ​these​ ​questions​ ​seemed​ ​simple;​ ​the​ ​US​ ​attempted​ ​to 
contain​ ​communism​ ​and​ ​vied​ ​for​ ​power​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union.​ ​These​ ​explanations​ ​no​ ​longer 
apply​ ​to ​ ​today’s​ ​unipolar​ ​system,​ ​and​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​need​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​policy​ ​reversals​ ​in​ ​recent 
decades.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​study​ ​I​ ​explore​ ​what​ ​specific​ ​factors​ ​lead​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to​ ​reverse​ ​its​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​a 
previously​ ​hostile​ ​country​ ​and​ ​establish​ ​a​ ​policy​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​in​ ​a​ ​post-Cold​ ​War​ ​world. 
​ ​​Understanding​ ​the​ ​attempts​ ​at​ ​rapprochement​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Vietnam,​ ​Iran,​ ​Libya, 
and​ ​Cuba​ ​is​ ​important​ ​because​ ​these​ ​policy​ ​changes​ ​were​ ​not​ ​inevitable,​ ​and​ ​unlike​ ​several​ ​other 
cases​ ​of​ ​US​ ​rapprochement,​ ​they​ ​occurred​ ​in​ ​a​ ​post-Cold​ ​War,​ ​unipolar​ ​system.​ ​A​ ​country’s 
relationship​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​is​ ​a​ ​defining​ ​factor​ ​for​ ​its​ ​economic​ ​and​ ​political​ ​success,​ ​and​ ​by 
extension​ ​its​ ​very​ ​survival.​ ​Therefore,​ ​understanding​ ​when,​ ​how,​ ​why,​ ​and​ ​to​ ​what​ ​extent​ ​of 













decision-makers​ ​not​ ​only​ ​in​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​but​ ​abroad​ ​as​ ​well.​ ​This​ ​research​ ​also​ ​has​ ​implications​ ​for 
future​ ​rapprochement​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​North​ ​Korea,​ ​Russia,​ ​and​ ​Iran.  
Two​ ​particular​ ​factors​ ​were​ ​chosen​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​focus​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study​ ​since​ ​they​ ​are​ ​likely 
critical​ ​in ​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​in​ ​the​ ​pursuit​ ​of​ ​rapprochement.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​factor​ ​examined​ ​in​ ​this​ ​study​ ​is​ ​a 
perception​ ​of​ ​potential​ ​gains​ ​for​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US.​ ​As​ ​economic​ ​gains​ ​become 
more​ ​apparent​ ​in​ ​a​ ​previously​ ​hostile​ ​country,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​is​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​rapprochement. 
This​ ​idea​ ​is​ ​formed​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​that​ ​the​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​produces​ ​domestic 
pressures​ ​which​ ​influence​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decision-makers.​ ​The​ ​second​ ​factor​ ​arises​ ​from 
international​ ​pressure​ ​for​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​US​ ​policy.​ ​When​ ​such​ ​pressure​ ​increases,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​is​ ​more 
likely​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​a​ ​policy​ ​of​ ​rapprochement.​ ​At​ ​the​ ​core​ ​of​ ​this​ ​idea​ ​is​ ​the​ ​conception​ ​that​ ​the 
structure​ ​and​ ​institution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​can​ ​sway​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decisions.  
The​ ​first​ ​section​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​reviews​ ​the​ ​existing​ ​literature​ ​on​ ​the​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​US 
rapprochement​ ​in​ ​recent​ ​decades,​ ​theoretical​ ​understandings​ ​of​ ​change​ ​in​ ​foreign​ ​policy,​ ​and 
international​ ​relations​ ​theory.​ ​The​ ​next​ ​section​ ​describes​ ​the​ ​logic​ ​behind​ ​choosing​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of 
Libya,​ ​Iran,​ ​Vietnam,​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​to​ ​analyze​ ​and​ ​compare,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​and​ ​secondary 
sources​ ​for​ ​my​ ​research.​ ​For​ ​each​ ​case,​ ​I​ ​first​ ​provide​ ​historical​ ​background​ ​and​ ​the​ ​timeline​ ​of 
rapprochement,​ ​then​ ​evaluate​ ​the​ ​presence​ ​and​ ​degree​ ​of​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two​ ​factors,​ ​perception 
of​ ​gains​ ​for​ ​economic​ ​interest​ ​and​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​change​ ​policy.​ ​​ ​The​ ​last​ ​section 
includes​ ​discussion​ ​and​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​my​ ​results,​ ​including​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​future​ ​US 
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Theory​ ​on​ ​foreign​ ​policy-decision​ ​making​ ​can​ ​offer​ ​some​ ​insight​ ​on​ ​the​ ​necessary​ ​factors 
and​ ​conditions​ ​for​ ​changing​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of​ ​a​ ​policy,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​research​ ​on 
rapprochement​ ​specifically.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​theoretical​ ​literature,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​divide​ ​between 
actor-specific​ ​analysis​ ​and​ ​structure-specific​ ​analysis,​ ​and​ ​this​ ​divide​ ​dictates​ ​the​ ​way​ ​foreign 
policy​ ​decision-making​ ​is​ ​studied​ ​and​ ​is​ ​worth​ ​more​ ​exploration.​ ​The​ ​major​ ​theoretical 
approaches​ ​to​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​are​ ​reliant​ ​on​ ​a​ ​structural​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​analysis.  
Structural​ ​Analysis​ ​in​ ​International​ ​Relations​ ​Theory 
The​ ​most​ ​significant​ ​division​ ​in​ ​the​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​theory​ ​literature​ ​is​ ​a 
disagreement​ ​on​ ​which​ ​level​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​should​ ​be​ ​used​ ​to​ ​analyze​ ​international​ ​politics​ ​and 
produce​ ​theory.​ ​Essentially,​ ​scholars​ ​are​ ​split​ ​into​ ​two​ ​factions:​ ​those​ ​in​ ​favor​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​the 
state​ ​actor​ ​(referring​ ​to​ ​the​ ​state’s​ ​president​ ​or​ ​government),​ ​and​ ​those​ ​in​ ​favor​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​on​ ​the 
structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system.​ ​The​ ​division​ ​over​ ​state-specific​ ​analysis​ ​and 
structure-specific​ ​analysis​ ​is​ ​crucial​ ​not​ ​only​ ​for​ ​understanding​ ​the​ ​literature​ ​on​ ​international 
relations​ ​theory,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​because​ ​any​ ​study​ ​using​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​theory​ ​must​ ​determine 
which​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​to​ ​pursue,​ ​or​ ​how​ ​to​ ​integrate​ ​the​ ​two​ ​appropriately.  
Structural​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decision-making​ ​is​ ​represented​ ​by​ ​the​ ​four​ ​major 
approaches​ ​to​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​theory,​ ​from​ ​which​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​body​ ​theory​ ​is 
based.​ ​These​ ​theoretical​ ​approaches​ ​are​ ​realism,​ ​liberalism,​ ​constructivism,​ ​and​ ​Marxism​ ​(Nye 
and​ ​Welch​ ​2013,​ ​62).​ ​Of​ ​these​ ​approaches,​ ​realism​ ​and​ ​liberalism​ ​have​ ​historically​ ​been​ ​the 













US​ ​foreign​ ​policy,​ ​Marxism​ ​does​ ​not​ ​apply​ ​to​ ​this​ ​context.​ ​Constructivism,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​hybrid​ ​of​ ​actor 
and​ ​structural​ ​analysis,​ ​will​ ​be​ ​discussed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​next​ ​section.  
Realism​ ​is​ ​characterized​ ​by​ ​the​ ​beliefs​ ​that​ ​states​ ​are​ ​the​ ​most​ ​important​ ​actors​ ​in​ ​the 
international​ ​system,​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​is​ ​anarchic,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​goal​ ​of​ ​politics​ ​is​ ​to​ ​attain 
power​ ​(Nye​ ​and​ ​Welch​ ​2013,​ ​62).​ ​International​ ​relations​ ​are​ ​driven​ ​by​ ​states’​ ​self​ ​interests, 
mainly​ ​security​ ​and​ ​power​ ​(Nye​ ​and​ ​Welch​ ​2013,​ ​64).​ ​Neorealism​ ​emphasizes​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of 
structure​ ​in ​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​balance​ ​of​ ​power​ ​among​ ​states. 
Liberalism,​ ​by​ ​contrast,​ ​views​ ​humans​ ​as​ ​less​ ​selfish,​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​state​ ​interests​ ​include 
welfare​ ​and​ ​justice​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​security.​ ​Unlike​ ​realists,​ ​liberalists​ ​do​ ​not​ ​perceive​ ​international 
relations​ ​as​ ​a​ ​zero-sum​ ​game.​ ​Liberalism​ ​emphasizes​ ​cooperation,​ ​and​ ​neoliberalism​ ​stresses​ ​the 
importance​ ​of​ ​international​ ​institutions​ ​for​ ​the​ ​pursuit​ ​and​ ​establishment​ ​of​ ​international​ ​peace. 
Neoliberalism​ ​is​ ​also​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​free-market​ ​economics​ ​and​ ​the​ ​international​ ​pursuit​ ​of 
economic​ ​gains​ ​(Nye​ ​and​ ​Welch​ ​2013,​ ​64-67). 
Much​ ​of​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​theory​ ​scholarship​ ​acknowledges​ ​realist​ ​interpretations, 
especially​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​state​ ​interests​ ​in​ ​security​ ​and​ ​power.​ ​Glenn​ ​Palmer​ ​and​ ​T.​ ​Clifton​ ​Morgan 
identify​ ​themselves​ ​as​ ​realists​ ​because​ ​their​ ​original​ ​theory​ ​focuses​ ​on​ ​a​ ​state’s​ ​self-interest; 
however,​ ​they​ ​claim​ ​neorealism​ ​is​ ​mistaken​ ​in​ ​identifying​ ​only​ ​one​ ​primary​ ​national​ ​interest​ ​for 
a​ ​state. ​ ​Instead​ ​they​ ​propose​ ​a​ ​“two-good”​ ​theory,​ ​which​ ​argues​ ​a​ ​state​ ​pursues​ ​two​ ​goods: 
change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​international​ ​status​ ​quo​ ​if​ ​it​ ​suits​ ​a​ ​state’s​ ​preferences,​ ​and​ ​maintenance​ ​of​ ​the 
international​ ​status​ ​quo​ ​if​ ​change​ ​does​ ​not​ ​suit​ ​a​ ​state’s​ ​preferences​ ​(Palmer​ ​and​ ​Morgan​ ​2010, 
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self-contradicting​ ​state​ ​behaviors.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​because​ ​the​ ​two-good​ ​theory​ ​evaluates​ ​foreign​ ​policy 
behaviors​ ​as​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​portfolio​ ​(Palmer​ ​and​ ​Morgan​ ​2010,​ ​17),​ ​which​ ​is​ ​a​ ​useful​ ​approach​ ​for​ ​a 
comparative​ ​case​ ​study.  
Like​ ​Palmer​ ​and​ ​Morgan,​ ​Mark​ ​Beeson​ ​and​ ​Richard​ ​Higgott​ ​identify​ ​themselves​ ​as 
realists,​ ​but ​ ​they​ ​highlight​ ​the​ ​limitations​ ​of​ ​theory​ ​based​ ​on​ ​structural​ ​analysis.​ ​Beeson​ ​and 
Higgott​ ​argue​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​has​ ​changed​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​unipolar​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international 
system​ ​after​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Cold​ ​War​ ​(Beeson​ ​and​ ​Higgott​ ​2005,​ ​1175).​ ​At​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time,​ ​Beeson 
and​ ​Higgott​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​has​ ​always​ ​been​ ​mediated​ ​by​ ​US​ ​domestic​ ​interests 
rather​ ​than​ ​the​ ​logic​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​(Beeson​ ​and​ ​Higgott​ ​2005,​ ​1175).​ ​By 
maintaining​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​exercises​ ​its​ ​economic​ ​policy​ ​as​ ​an​ ​arm​ ​of​ ​its​ ​security​ ​policy​ ​in 
contradiction​ ​of​ ​its​ ​liberal​ ​principles​ ​(Beeson​ ​and​ ​Higgott​ ​2005,​ ​1180-1181),​ ​Beeson​ ​and​ ​Higgott 
argue​ ​that​ ​a​ ​state​ ​can​ ​switch​ ​between​ ​a​ ​liberalist​ ​structure​ ​and​ ​a​ ​realist​ ​structure.​ ​David​ ​Welch 
uses​ ​this​ ​argument​ ​as​ ​a​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​both​ ​realism​ ​and​ ​liberalism,​ ​as​ ​they​ ​can​ ​only​ ​explain​ ​“the 
behavior​ ​of​ ​the​ ​states​ ​whose​ ​leaders​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​subscribe​ ​to​ ​them”​ ​(Welch​ ​2005,​ ​7),​ ​rather​ ​than 
the​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​itself.​ ​Beeson​ ​and​ ​Higgott’s​ ​and​ ​Welch’s​ ​arguments 
establish​ ​a​ ​need​ ​for​ ​refined,​ ​specific,​ ​and​ ​testable​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​theories​ ​to​ ​exceed​ ​the 
limits​ ​of​ ​realism​ ​and​ ​liberalism. 
Realist​ ​and​ ​liberalist​ ​theories​ ​use​ ​the​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​and 
predict​ ​a​ ​state’s​ ​foreign​ ​policy,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​states​ ​that​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​influences​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to 
change​ ​course​ ​in​ ​its​ ​foreign​ ​policy.​ ​​ ​However,​ ​many​ ​scholars​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​main​ ​structural 













and​ ​cultural​ ​context.​ ​Many​ ​scholars​ ​favor​ ​actor-specific​ ​analysis​ ​instead​ ​of​ ​structural​ ​analysis, 
and​ ​increasingly​ ​scholars​ ​are​ ​exploring​ ​constructivist​ ​combinations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two. 
Actor-Specific​ ​Analysis  
In​ ​Valerie​ ​Hudson’s​ ​literature​ ​review​ ​of​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​actor-specific​ ​theory,​ ​she 
argues​ ​that​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​are​ ​between​ ​countries,​ ​which​ ​are​ ​made​ ​up​ ​of​ ​humans,​ ​and​ ​as 
such,​ ​human​ ​decision-makers​ ​are​ ​the​ ​crucial​ ​actors​ ​(Hudson​ ​2005,​ ​1).​ ​Hudson​ ​categorizes​ ​the 
interdisciplinary,​ ​integrated​ ​explanations​ ​of​ ​actor-specific​ ​analysis​ ​into​ ​individual​ ​characteristics 
and​ ​national/societal​ ​characteristics​ ​(Hudson​ ​2005,​ ​10).​ ​National​ ​characteristics​ ​of​ ​an​ ​actor 
include​ ​culture​ ​and​ ​domestic​ ​political​ ​imperatives,​ ​the​ ​most​ ​influential​ ​of​ ​which​ ​are​ ​elite​ ​and 
public​ ​opinion​ ​(Hudson​ ​2005,​ ​12).​ ​This​ ​establishes​ ​domestic​ ​pressures​ ​as​ ​a​ ​factor​ ​of 
actor-specific​ ​analysis,​ ​an​ ​important​ ​distinction​ ​for​ ​deciding​ ​whether​ ​a​ ​researcher​ ​should​ ​choose 
to​ ​perform​ ​an​ ​actor-specific​ ​analysis​ ​or​ ​a​ ​structural-specific​ ​analysis.​ ​It​ ​also​ ​supports​ ​my 
hypothesis​ ​that​ ​the​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​interests,​ ​especially​ ​by​ ​the​ ​elite,​ ​applies​ ​domestic 
pressure​ ​onto​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decision-maker​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a​ ​change.  
A​ ​number​ ​of​ ​scholars​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​Hudson​ ​and​ ​have​ ​executed​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​integrative 
explanations​ ​she​ ​posits.​ ​Welch​ ​agrees​ ​with​ ​Hudson’s​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​actor-specific​ ​analysis, 
claiming​ ​individual​ ​decision-makers​ ​can​ ​take​ ​cues​ ​from​ ​any​ ​level​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​(Welch​ ​2005,​ ​13). 
While​ ​Ambrose​ ​and​ ​Brinkley​ ​incorporate​ ​both​ ​actor​ ​and​ ​structural​ ​explanations​ ​into​ ​their 
historical​ ​analysis,​ ​they​ ​apply​ ​a​ ​heavier​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​actor-specific​ ​analysis​ ​(Ambrose​ ​and​ ​Brinkley 
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policy​ ​textbook​ ​to​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​the​ ​bureaucracy​ ​and​ ​individuals​ ​as​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decision-makers 
(Jones​ ​and ​ ​Wittkopf​ ​2008,​ ​325,​ ​453,​ ​491). 
Some​ ​scholars​ ​attribute​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decision-making​ ​to​ ​domestic​ ​forces​ ​themselves, 
rather​ ​than​ ​attributing​ ​agency​ ​to​ ​the​ ​actor,​ ​but​ ​these​ ​understandings​ ​still​ ​work​ ​within​ ​the 
framework​ ​of​ ​actor​ ​analysis.​ ​Jack​ ​Holmes’s​ ​defense​ ​of​ ​mood/interest​ ​theory​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​US 
foreign​ ​policy​ ​is​ ​ultimately​ ​dictated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​moods​ ​or​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​the​ ​American​ ​public;​ ​the 
American​ ​public​ ​creates​ ​a​ ​domestic​ ​environment​ ​or​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​which​ ​government​ ​leaders 
respond​ ​(Holmes​ ​1985,​ ​20).​ ​Frank​ ​Gadinger​ ​and​ ​Dirk​ ​Peter’s​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​feedback​ ​takes​ ​the 
importance​ ​of​ ​public​ ​opinion​ ​a​ ​step​ ​further,​ ​arguing​ ​that​ ​information​ ​itself​ ​acts​ ​as​ ​the​ ​source 
ultimately​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decisions,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the​ ​link​ ​between​ ​the​ ​environment​ ​and 
the​ ​decision-maker​ ​(Gadinger​ ​and​ ​Peter​ ​2016,​ ​259-260).​ ​These​ ​arguments​ ​are​ ​important​ ​in​ ​this 
body​ ​of​ ​literature​ ​because​ ​they​ ​represent​ ​domestic​ ​factors​ ​which​ ​influence​ ​foreign​ ​policy 
decision-makers.  
Recent​ ​scholarship​ ​shows​ ​a​ ​growing​ ​trend​ ​towards​ ​a​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​actor​ ​and​ ​structural 
analysis,​ ​inspired​ ​by​ ​constructivism​ ​theory.​ ​Constructivism​ ​maintains​ ​that​ ​actors​ ​and​ ​structures 
interact​ ​and​ ​social​ ​interaction​ ​causes​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system​ ​(Nye​ ​and 
Welch​ ​2013,​ ​70).​ ​Social​ ​constructivist​ ​scholars​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​incorporate​ ​a​ ​of​ ​role​ ​for​ ​actor-specific 
theory​ ​within​ ​a​ ​structural​ ​context​ ​using​ ​sociological​ ​and​ ​psychological​ ​concepts.​ ​Hafner-Burton, 
Kahler,​ ​and​ ​Montgomery​ ​present​ ​network​ ​analysis​ ​as​ ​complementary​ ​to​ ​the​ ​structural​ ​approach 
(Hafner-Burton​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2009,​ ​560).​ ​They​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​patterns​ ​of​ ​association​ ​between​ ​states​ ​define, 













international​ ​system​ ​(Hafner-Burton​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2009,​ ​583).​ ​Harnisch​ ​claims​ ​role​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​intended​ ​to 
explain​ ​the ​ ​interaction​ ​between​ ​actors​ ​and​ ​structure​ ​by​ ​identifying​ ​the​ ​roles​ ​states​ ​ascribe​ ​to​ ​each 
other​ ​and​ ​the​ ​roles​ ​they​ ​achieve​ ​for​ ​themselves,​ ​mirroring​ ​the​ ​socialization​ ​of​ ​individual​ ​humans 
in​ ​a​ ​society ​ ​(Harnisch​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​2011,​ ​11).​ ​It​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​these​ ​perspectives​ ​not​ ​only 
because​ ​they​ ​can​ ​be​ ​applied​ ​to​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​change,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​because​ ​they​ ​act​ ​as 
models​ ​for​ ​combining​ ​structural​ ​and​ ​actor​ ​analyses.​ ​This​ ​may​ ​be​ ​the​ ​most​ ​holistic​ ​approach​ ​to 
understanding​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​changes.While​ ​the​ ​two​ ​hypotheses​ ​of​ ​my​ ​research​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​take 
opposing​ ​sides​ ​on​ ​the​ ​actor-structure​ ​debate,​ ​this​ ​literature​ ​demonstrates​ ​it​ ​is​ ​possible​ ​for​ ​both​ ​to 
be​ ​valid​ ​and​ ​inclusive​ ​of​ ​each​ ​other.  
Change​ ​in ​ ​Foreign​ ​Policy​ ​Theory 
The​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​this​ ​review​ ​has​ ​focused​ ​on​ ​characteristics​ ​of​ ​international​ ​relations 
theories​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​theories​ ​which​ ​can​ ​help​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​the​ ​US​ ​reverses​ ​its​ ​foreign 
policies​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​rapprochement.​ ​This​ ​was​ ​necessary​ ​because​ ​international​ ​relations​ ​theory 
specifically​ ​addressing​ ​rapprochement​ ​is​ ​either​ ​too​ ​rare​ ​to​ ​find​ ​or​ ​does​ ​not​ ​exist.​ ​However,​ ​there 
is​ ​theoretical​ ​work​ ​on​ ​general​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​foreign​ ​policy,​ ​and​ ​while​ ​this​ ​work​ ​has​ ​largely​ ​been 
used​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​wars​ ​and​ ​trade​ ​deals,​ ​it​ ​can​ ​be​ ​useful​ ​for​ ​understanding​ ​rapprochement. 
Charles​ ​Hermann’s​ ​work​ ​defines​ ​major​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​as​ ​changes​ ​in 
adjustment,​ ​program,​ ​goals,​ ​and​ ​international​ ​orientation.​ ​Hermann​ ​defines​ ​four​ ​decision-making 
forces​ ​when​ ​a​ ​need​ ​for​ ​policy​ ​change​ ​becomes​ ​apparent:​ ​individual​ ​leaders,​ ​the​ ​bureaucracy, 
domestic​ ​restructure,​ ​and​ ​external​ ​shock​ ​(Hermann​ ​1990,​ ​13).​ ​He​ ​describes​ ​the​ ​necessary 
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5).​ ​One​ ​of​ ​the​ ​main​ ​theories​ ​he​ ​posits​ ​is​ ​that​ ​decision-makers​ ​must​ ​perceive​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the 
status​ ​quo​ ​for​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​government​ ​policy​ ​to​ ​be​ ​triggered​ ​(Hermann​ ​1990,​ ​3).​ ​This​ ​change 
could​ ​be ​ ​domestic​ ​popular​ ​opinion,​ ​threat​ ​perception,​ ​or​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​economic-political 
system​ ​(Hermann​ ​1990,​ ​12).​ ​While​ ​this​ ​work​ ​has​ ​valuable​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​reversal 
and​ ​rapprochement,​ ​Hermann’s​ ​definitions​ ​of​ ​potential​ ​policy-influencing​ ​shifts​ ​in​ ​the​ ​status​ ​quo 
are​ ​untested​ ​and​ ​ambiguous.​ ​The​ ​required​ ​conditions​ ​for​ ​a​ ​decision-maker​ ​to​ ​begin 
contemplating​ ​changing​ ​policy​ ​as​ ​described​ ​by​ ​Hermann​ ​are​ ​too​ ​vague​ ​to​ ​use​ ​as​ ​anything​ ​other 
than​ ​a​ ​starting​ ​point​ ​for​ ​understanding​ ​why​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​begins.  
Unlike​ ​Hermann,​ ​Welch​ ​posits​ ​just​ ​three​ ​specific​ ​hypotheses​ ​and​ ​tests​ ​them​ ​empirically, 
and​ ​he ​ ​considers​ ​the​ ​results​ ​positive​ ​enough​ ​they​ ​can​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​theory​ ​(Welch​ ​2005,​ ​184). 
His​ ​theoretical​ ​conclusions​ ​are:​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​change​ ​is​ ​less​ ​frequent​ ​in​ ​highly​ ​bureaucratic 
states;​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​occur​ ​when​ ​the​ ​existing​ ​policy​ ​fails​ ​either​ ​repeatedly​ ​or 
catastrophically;​ ​and​ ​leaders​ ​are​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​take​ ​the​ ​risk​ ​of​ ​changing​ ​a​ ​policy​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to 
avoid​ ​losses​ ​than​ ​they​ ​are​ ​to​ ​take​ ​a​ ​risk​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​realize​ ​equal​ ​gains​ ​(Welch​ ​2005,​ ​30).  
Hermann’s​ ​work​ ​complements​ ​Welch’s​ ​work​ ​well.​ ​They​ ​both​ ​produce​ ​theories​ ​that​ ​can 
be​ ​widely​ ​applicable,​ ​are​ ​not​ ​restricted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​conceptions​ ​of​ ​realism​ ​or​ ​liberalism,​ ​and​ ​can​ ​be 
integrated​ ​with​ ​each​ ​other​ ​well.​ ​Welch’s​ ​theory​ ​that​ ​policy​ ​change​ ​is​ ​less​ ​common​ ​in​ ​more 
bureaucratic​ ​states​ ​can​ ​be​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​Hermann’s​ ​complex​ ​decision-​ ​making​ ​model,​ ​which 
Hermann​ ​claims​ ​is​ ​more​ ​difficult​ ​for​ ​bureaucracies​ ​than​ ​it​ ​is​ ​for​ ​single​ ​actors​ ​to​ ​follow​ ​because 














Implications​ ​for​ ​US​ ​Rapprochement 
With​ ​the​ ​main​ ​theoretical​ ​questions​ ​and​ ​their​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​rapprochement​ ​now 
discussed,​ ​scholars’​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​historical,​ ​political,​ ​and​ ​theoretical​ ​contexts​ ​the​ ​Iran, 
Libya,​ ​Vietnam,​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​cases​ ​can​ ​be​ ​evaluated​ ​for​ ​their​ ​contributions​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​US 
foreign​ ​policy. 
Matthew​ ​Fehrs​ ​tests​ ​several​ ​hypotheses​ ​to​ ​illustrate​ ​certain​ ​conditions​ ​required​ ​for​ ​US 
rapprochement.​ ​He​ ​analyzes​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​early​ ​US-Vietnamese​ ​rapprochement​ ​and​ ​compares​ ​it 
to​ ​the​ ​failed​ ​US-Iranian​ ​rapprochement.​ ​Fehrs​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​both​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​and​ ​a​ ​change 
in​ ​threat​ ​perception​ ​improved​ ​rapprochement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Vietnam,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​was​ ​not​ ​a 
significant​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​incentives​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Iran​ ​for​ ​rapprochement​ ​to​ ​succeed 
there.​ ​Frederick​ ​Brown’s​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​US-Vietnamese​ ​rapprochement​ ​differs​ ​from​ ​Fehrs’s 
conclusions;​ ​while​ ​he​ ​acknowledges​ ​China’s​ ​rising​ ​power​ ​as​ ​a​ ​concern​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​Brown 
explicitly​ ​rejects​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​that​ ​rapprochement​ ​continued​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration 
purely​ ​due​ ​to​ ​a​ ​geopolitical​ ​strategy​ ​to​ ​balance​ ​regional​ ​power​ ​with​ ​China,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​the​ ​popular 
neorealist​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​policy​ ​(Brown​ ​2010,​ ​333).​ ​Instead,​ ​Brown​ ​emphasizes​ ​context 
and​ ​the​ ​wide​ ​array​ ​of​ ​relevant​ ​actors​ ​and​ ​influences.​ ​Unlike​ ​Fehrs,​ ​Brown​ ​does​ ​not​ ​propose​ ​a 
hypothesis​ ​based​ ​on​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​rapprochement,​ ​but​ ​he​ ​does​ ​make​ ​his​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nature 
of​ ​rapprochement​ ​clear;​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​long,​ ​gradual​ ​process,​ ​consisting​ ​of​ ​small​ ​steps​ ​and​ ​spanning 
decades.​ ​Fehrs​ ​does​ ​not​ ​consider​ ​rapprochement​ ​in​ ​this​ ​way​ ​and​ ​ends​ ​his​ ​study​ ​of 
US-Vietnamese​ ​rapprochement​ ​after​ ​1995,​ ​abandoning​ ​two​ ​decades​ ​of​ ​potential​ ​analysis. 
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Fehrs’s​ ​account​ ​of​ ​the​ ​failed​ ​attempt​ ​at​ ​rapprochement​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran​ ​lacks 
thorough​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​study​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​significant​ ​insight​ ​on​ ​rapprochement.​ ​According​ ​to 
Fehrs,​ ​US​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Iran​ ​failed​ ​because​ ​neither​ ​economic​ ​opportunity​ ​nor​ ​shared​ ​fear 
of​ ​a​ ​common​ ​threat​ ​were​ ​present​ ​(Fehrs​ ​2016,​ ​142).​ ​He​ ​also​ ​acknowledges​ ​alternative 
explanations:​ ​the​ ​likelihood​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​was​ ​perceived​ ​as​ ​small​ ​from​ ​the​ ​beginning,​ ​and 
hawkish​ ​leadership​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​create​ ​incentives​ ​for​ ​either​ ​side​ ​to​ ​want​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​reconciliation 
(Fehrs​ ​2016,​ ​142).  
Since​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the​ ​2015​ ​Iran​ ​nuclear​ ​deal,​ ​another,​ ​more​ ​successful​ ​wave​ ​of 
US-Iranian​ ​rapprochement​ ​seems​ ​possible.​ ​Najimdeem​ ​Bakare​ ​analyzes​ ​the​ ​beginning​ ​of​ ​a​ ​new 
US-Iranian​ ​rapprochement,​ ​arguing​ ​it​ ​was​ ​made​ ​possible​ ​by​ ​multilateral​ ​efforts​ ​in​ ​Europe. 
Unlike​ ​Fehrs,​ ​Bakare​ ​combines​ ​this​ ​structure-specific​ ​argument​ ​with​ ​an​ ​actor-specific​ ​argument 
claiming​ ​policy-makers​ ​in​ ​both​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran​ ​want​ ​to​ ​sustain​ ​rapprochement​ ​(Bakare​ ​2016, 
159-160).​ ​Bakare​ ​identifies​ ​both​ ​leadership​ ​personalities​ ​and​ ​shifts​ ​in​ ​domestic​ ​public​ ​opinion, 
both​ ​in ​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​in​ ​Iran,​ ​as​ ​theoretical​ ​grounds​ ​for​ ​upholding​ ​rapprochement​ ​(Bakare​ ​2016, 
155).​ ​Assuming​ ​the​ ​continued​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the​ ​2015​ ​Iran​ ​nuclear​ ​deal,​ ​more​ ​research​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be 
done​ ​on​ ​transforming​ ​US-Iranian​ ​relations​ ​and​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​rapprochement.​ ​For​ ​now,​ ​scholars 
should​ ​explore​ ​a​ ​more​ ​thorough,​ ​comprehensive​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​failed​ ​attempt​ ​at 
rapprochement​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran.  
Scholarship​ ​on​ ​US​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Libya​ ​differs​ ​very​ ​little,​ ​and​ ​shares​ ​some 
commonalities​ ​with​ ​the​ ​case​ ​study​ ​of​ ​Iranian​ ​rapprochement.​ ​Like​ ​Bakare,​ ​Jentleson​ ​and 













2003​ ​US-Libyan​ ​rapprochement​ ​emphasizes​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​multilateralism​ ​in​ ​establishing 
rapprochement,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to​ ​implementing​ ​economic​ ​sanctions​ ​(Jentleson​ ​and 
Whytock​ ​2005,​ ​82).​ ​Wittkopf​ ​and​ ​Jones​ ​also​ ​argue​ ​it​ ​was​ ​the​ ​sanctions​ ​that​ ​pushed​ ​Libya​ ​toward 
cooperation​ ​in​ ​renouncing​ ​its​ ​nuclear,​ ​chemical,​ ​and​ ​biological​ ​weapons​ ​(Jones​ ​and​ ​Wittkopf 
2008,​ ​66).​ ​Interpreting​ ​the​ ​aftermath​ ​of​ ​Libya’s​ ​disarmament​ ​proves​ ​to​ ​be​ ​more​ ​useful​ ​for​ ​the 
study​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​as​ ​a​ ​process.​ ​Dana​ ​Moss​ ​outlines​ ​important​ ​lessons​ ​from​ ​the​ ​US-Libyan 
rapprochement,​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​prominent​ ​of​ ​which​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​Libya​ ​gained​ ​more​ ​from​ ​the​ ​new 
positive​ ​relationship​ ​than​ ​the​ ​US​ ​did.​ ​Moss​ ​argues​ ​Libya​ ​enjoyed​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​increase 
international​ ​status​ ​by​ ​agreeing​ ​to​ ​disarmament​ ​(Moss​ ​2010,​ ​15).​ ​Moss​ ​approaches​ ​this​ ​case​ ​with 
a​ ​cost-benefit​ ​perspective;​ ​the​ ​US​ ​saw​ ​little​ ​benefits​ ​for​ ​itself​ ​after​ ​Libya’s​ ​renouncement​ ​of​ ​its 
weapons,​ ​while​ ​Libya​ ​utilized​ ​its​ ​elevated​ ​international​ ​status​ ​to​ ​promote​ ​its​ ​own​ ​national 
interests​ ​(Moss​ ​2010,​ ​15).  
Explanations​ ​for​ ​US-Cuban​ ​diplomatic​ ​normalization​ ​are​ ​not​ ​widely​ ​available​ ​since​ ​it​ ​is 
the​ ​most​ ​recent​ ​of​ ​these​ ​case​ ​studies​ ​and​ ​because​ ​the​ ​continuation​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​is​ ​in​ ​danger 
in​ ​the​ ​current​ ​political​ ​situation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US.​ ​Both​ ​​Jiménez​ ​and​ ​LeoGrande​ ​provide​ ​international, 
security,​ ​economic,​ ​and​ ​domestic​ ​contexts​ ​for​ ​US-Cuban​ ​relations.​ ​Jiménez​ ​thoroughly​ ​explains 
the​ ​obstacles​ ​which​ ​had​ ​prevented​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​from​ ​normalizing​ ​relations​ ​(Jiménez​ ​2012, 
362).​ ​Similarly,​ ​LeoGrande​ ​analyzes​ ​the​ ​factors​ ​which​ ​maintained​ ​the​ ​same,​ ​ineffective​ ​US 
foreign​ ​policy​ ​for​ ​decades​ ​(LeoGrande​ ​2015,​ ​478).​ ​They​ ​both​ ​focus​ ​largely​ ​on​ ​negative 
pressures​ ​which​ ​prevent​ ​change​ ​in​ ​foreign​ ​policy,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​the​ ​positive​ ​factors​ ​for​ ​change 
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LeoGrande’s​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​international​ ​pressure,​ ​especially​ ​from​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​states,​ ​to 
soften​ ​US​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​Cuba​ ​implies​ ​the​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​international​ ​community​ ​impacts​ ​US 
foreign​ ​policy​ ​change​ ​(LeoGrande​ ​2015,​ ​476).​ ​Jiménez​ ​offers​ ​a​ ​different​ ​approach​ ​in​ ​her 
analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​national​ ​interests​ ​and​ ​benefits​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​could​ ​share​ ​if​ ​they​ ​pursued 
rapprochement.​ ​Unlike​ ​Moss,​ ​Jiménez​ ​conveys​ ​that​ ​US-Cuban​ ​rapprochement​ ​would​ ​be 
mutually​ ​beneficial​ ​in​ ​realist​ ​and​ ​cost-effective​ ​terms​ ​(Jiménez​ ​2012,​ ​368).​ ​Jiménez’s​ ​and 
LeoGrande’s​ ​works​ ​cover​ ​much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​necessary​ ​background​ ​for​ ​understanding​ ​US-Cuban 
relations​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​normalization,​ ​but​ ​they​ ​are​ ​extremely​ ​limited​ ​in​ ​their​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​US 
motivation​ ​for​ ​rapprochement.​ ​Generally,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​need​ ​for​ ​more​ ​scholarly​ ​research​ ​on 
US-Cuban​ ​rapprochement,​ ​its​ ​causes,​ ​its​ ​theoretical​ ​implications,​ ​and​ ​its​ ​future​ ​prospects.  
This​ ​literature​ ​review​ ​has​ ​evaluated​ ​the​ ​main​ ​theoretical​ ​divide​ ​among​ ​international 
relations​ ​theorists​ ​and​ ​its​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​future​ ​theoretical​ ​research.​ ​The​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​limited​ ​in 
regards​ ​explanations​ ​which​ ​can​ ​be​ ​applied​ ​to​ ​rapprochement.​ ​By​ ​interpreting​ ​theory​ ​on​ ​foreign 
policy​ ​changes​ ​and​ ​integrating​ ​theories​ ​from​ ​different​ ​theorists,​ ​I​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​alone​ ​these 
theories​ ​were​ ​insufficient,​ ​but​ ​together​ ​they​ ​could​ ​offer​ ​insight​ ​on​ ​why​ ​US​ ​rapprochement 
occurs.​ ​Finally,​ ​I​ ​reviewed​ ​the​ ​historical,​ ​political,​ ​and​ ​theoretical​ ​contexts​ ​and​ ​implications​ ​of 
the​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​Vietnam,​ ​Iran,​ ​Libya,​ ​and​ ​Cuba.​ ​Historical​ ​interpretations​ ​and​ ​explanations​ ​for 
rapprochement​ ​in​ ​these​ ​case​ ​studies​ ​are​ ​available,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​is​ ​an​ ​absence​ ​of​ ​political​ ​and 
theoretical ​ ​explanation.​ ​Therefore,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​need​ ​for​ ​a​ ​comparative​ ​case​ ​study​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​main 
factors​ ​in​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​decision-making​ ​and​ ​its​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​international​ ​relations 














To​ ​analyze​ ​the​ ​the​ ​first​ ​main​ ​factor​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study,​ ​US​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​benefits​ ​in 
the​ ​targeted​ ​country,​ ​I​ ​evaluate​ ​relevant​ ​statements​ ​from​ ​presidents​ ​and​ ​Congressional​ ​committee 
hearings;​ ​examine​ ​significant​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​the​ ​trade​ ​markets​ ​of​ ​Iran,​ ​Libya,​ ​Cuba,​ ​and​ ​Vietnam​ ​in 
the​ ​relevant​ ​time​ ​periods;​ ​and​ ​identify​ ​any​ ​interest​ ​of​ ​US​ ​businesses​ ​to​ ​work​ ​in​ ​these​ ​countries.​ ​If 
these​ ​factors​ ​demonstrate​ ​US​ ​businesses​ ​and​ ​the​ ​US​ ​government​ ​perceive​ ​economic 
opportunities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​study​ ​countries,​ ​this​ ​perception​ ​acts​ ​as​ ​a​ ​domestic​ ​political​ ​and 
economic​ ​incentive​ ​to​ ​normalize​ ​relations.  
The​ ​second​ ​factor,​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​and​ ​support​ ​for​ ​changing​ ​policy,​ ​is​ ​analyzed 
using​ ​presidential​ ​and​ ​government​ ​official​ ​statements,​ ​and​ ​Congressional​ ​committee​ ​hearings.​ ​I 
also​ ​evaluate​ ​positive​ ​or​ ​negative​ ​American​ ​sentiment​ ​abroad,​ ​international​ ​leaders’​ ​opinions 
regarding​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​which​ ​are​ ​available​ ​through​ ​press​ ​conferences​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​president​ ​and 
news​ ​releases​ ​concerning​ ​international​ ​organizations,​ ​including​ ​statements​ ​from​ ​leaders​ ​in 
United​ ​Nations​ ​and​ ​regional​ ​international​ ​bodies​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​Organization​ ​of​ ​American​ ​States.  
The​ ​domain​ ​of​ ​reversal​ ​of​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​and​ ​pursuit​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​includes​ ​the 
cases​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Iran,​ ​Libya,​ ​Vietnam,​ ​and​ ​Cuba.​ ​These​ ​cases​ ​were​ ​chosen​ ​because 
they​ ​all​ ​occurred​ ​in​ ​an​ ​international​ ​system​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​dominated​ ​by​ ​Cold​ ​War​ ​bipolar​ ​politics. 
Therefore​ ​they​ ​can​ ​provide​ ​insight​ ​on​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​other​ ​countries​ ​in​ ​a​ ​unipolar, 
US-dominated​ ​system.​ ​While​ ​they​ ​share​ ​some​ ​economic,​ ​security,​ ​and​ ​geopolitical​ ​explanations, 
the​ ​policy​ ​changes​ ​occurred​ ​under​ ​different​ ​presidents​ ​of​ ​different​ ​political​ ​parties,​ ​in​ ​different 
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This​ ​research​ ​will​ ​be​ ​conducted​ ​through​ ​a​ ​comparative​ ​case​ ​study.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​appropriate 
because​ ​my​ ​research​ ​is​ ​exploratory,​ ​as​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​are 
quite​ ​recent.​ ​A​ ​comparative​ ​case​ ​study​ ​is​ ​also​ ​useful​ ​for​ ​this​ ​research​ ​because​ ​it​ ​is​ ​primarily 
explanatory,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​find​ ​a​ ​causal​ ​relationship​ ​for​ ​a​ ​phenomenon​ ​(Johnson​ ​and​ ​Reynolds 
2012,​ ​196).​ ​Including​ ​four​ ​cases​ ​in​ ​this​ ​study​ ​strengthens​ ​the​ ​study’s​ ​internal​ ​validity​ ​because​ ​the 
analysis​ ​will​ ​be​ ​repeated​ ​four​ ​times,​ ​and​ ​including​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​failed​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Iran 
could​ ​provide​ ​valuable​ ​evidence​ ​through​ ​a​ ​method​ ​of​ ​difference​ ​approach​ ​(Johnson​ ​and 
Reynolds​ ​2012,​ ​198).  
This​ ​study​ ​is​ ​non-experimental,​ ​as​ ​I​ ​have​ ​no​ ​control​ ​over​ ​the​ ​subjects​ ​or​ ​the​ ​environment 
of​ ​the​ ​study.​ ​A​ ​disadvantage​ ​of​ ​this​ ​design​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​will​ ​be​ ​difficult​ ​to​ ​know​ ​that​ ​I​ ​have​ ​included 
all​ ​the​ ​important​ ​antecedent​ ​variables;​ ​there​ ​are​ ​complicated​ ​histories​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​the 
other​ ​four​ ​countries​ ​included​ ​this​ ​study,​ ​and​ ​there​ ​could​ ​be​ ​bias​ ​in​ ​determining​ ​what​ ​historical 
information​ ​is​ ​included​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study.​ ​The​ ​internal​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study​ ​could​ ​be​ ​weakened​ ​by 
interaction​ ​of​ ​variables​ ​which​ ​were​ ​not​ ​included​ ​in​ ​my​ ​hypotheses,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​personal​ ​relationships 
between​ ​diplomats,​ ​the​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​third-party​ ​mediators,​ ​or​ ​domestic​ ​pressure​ ​from​ ​within​ ​the 
isolated​ ​countries.​ ​The​ ​external​ ​validity​ ​could​ ​be​ ​weakened​ ​by​ ​the​ ​assumption​ ​that​ ​the​ ​causation 
found​ ​is​ ​too​ ​deterministic​ ​and​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​applied​ ​generally​ ​(Johnson​ ​and​ ​Reynolds​ ​2012,​ ​200).  
To​ ​evaluate​ ​both​ ​factors,​ ​I​ ​look​ ​primarily​ ​at​ ​official​ ​statements​ ​from​ ​US​ ​presidents, 
Congressional​ ​hearings,​ ​and​ ​US​ ​government​ ​documents,​ ​which​ ​are​ ​used​ ​to​ ​measure​ ​the​ ​US 
government’s​ ​perceptions​ ​of​ ​historical​ ​events,​ ​strategic​ ​concerns,​ ​and​ ​official​ ​descriptions​ ​of 













scope.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​important​ ​information​ ​which​ ​I​ ​cannot​ ​gain​ ​access​ ​to,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​private 
conversations​ ​between​ ​American​ ​and​ ​foreign​ ​diplomats,​ ​or​ ​intentions​ ​of​ ​leaders​ ​in​ ​private 
businesses.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​presidential​ ​statements​ ​are​ ​prone​ ​to​ ​framing​ ​information,​ ​including 
president’s ​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​information,​ ​for​ ​political​ ​purposes​ ​and​ ​require​ ​some​ ​analysis.​ ​So 
analysis​ ​of​ ​official​ ​statements​ ​must​ ​also​ ​be​ ​careful​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​misinterpreting​ ​or​ ​over-analyzing​ ​the 
relevant​ ​remarks.  
In​ ​addition​ ​to​ ​official​ ​statements​ ​and​ ​Congressional​ ​hearings,​ ​to​ ​specifically​ ​address 
economic​ ​factor,​ ​I​ ​also​ ​use​ ​statistics​ ​from​ ​secondary​ ​sources​ ​on​ ​relevant​ ​market​ ​trends​ ​and 
where​ ​appropriate,​ ​domestic​ ​public​ ​opinion​ ​polls.​ ​To​ ​investigate​ ​the​ ​factor​ ​of​ ​international 
pressure,​ ​I​ ​will​ ​look​ ​at​ ​official​ ​statements​ ​from​ ​joint​ ​presidential​ ​press​ ​conferences​ ​and 
international​ ​organizations.​ ​Like​ ​presidential​ ​remarks,​ ​careful​ ​analysis​ ​and​ ​contextualization​ ​of 
these​ ​statements​ ​are​ ​necessary​ ​but​ ​could​ ​pose​ ​a​ ​challenge.​ ​Another​ ​logistical​ ​challenge​ ​of​ ​using 
these​ ​sources​ ​is​ ​choosing​ ​which​ ​statements​ ​to​ ​include,​ ​considering​ ​the​ ​multitude​ ​of​ ​options​ ​and 
large​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​international​ ​bodies.​ ​Finally,​ ​I​ ​will​ ​include​ ​polling​ ​data​ ​on​ ​global​ ​attitudes​ ​toward 
the​ ​US​ ​in​ ​the​ ​relevant​ ​periods.​ ​Because​ ​I​ ​cannot​ ​prove​ ​a​ ​causal​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​US​ ​foreign 
policy​ ​and​ ​international​ ​opinions​ ​alone,​ ​this​ ​data​ ​will​ ​act​ ​as​ ​secondary​ ​evidence​ ​to​ ​support​ ​my 
analyses​ ​of​ ​international​ ​statements. 
Case​ ​1:​ ​The​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Libya  
Background 
In​ ​December​ ​1979,​ ​a​ ​mob​ ​attacked​ ​and​ ​set​ ​fire​ ​to​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​embassy​ ​in​ ​Tripoli, 
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diplomatic​ ​ties​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Libya.​ ​The​ ​US​ ​placed​ ​Libya​ ​on​ ​the​ ​list​ ​of​ ​state​ ​sponsors​ ​of 
terrorism,​ ​closed​ ​the​ ​Libyan​ ​embassy​ ​in​ ​Washington,​ ​and​ ​dispelled​ ​Libyan​ ​officials​ ​by​ ​1981.​ ​In 
response​ ​to​ ​Libya’s​ ​support​ ​of​ ​international​ ​terrorism,​ ​President​ ​Ronald​ ​Reagan​ ​declared​ ​a 
National​ ​Emergency​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​Libya,​ ​ordered​ ​military​ ​air​ ​strikes​ ​against​ ​Libya,​ ​froze 
Libyan​ ​assets​ ​in​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​and​ ​imposed​ ​economic​ ​sanctions,​ ​banning​ ​most​ ​trade​ ​and​ ​travel​ ​to 
Libya​ ​by​ ​1986​ ​(Jentleson​ ​and​ ​Whytock​ ​2005).​ ​In​ ​1996,​ ​the​ ​Iran-Libya​ ​Sanctions​ ​Act​ ​gave​ ​the 
president​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​impose​ ​sanctions​ ​on​ ​foreign​ ​companies​ ​with​ ​significant​ ​investments​ ​in 
Libya’s​ ​oil​ ​industry​ ​(Newnham​ ​2009).​ ​Secret​ ​negotiations​ ​between​ ​British,​ ​Libyan,​ ​and​ ​US 
officials​ ​had​ ​begun​ ​late​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Clinton​ ​administration​ ​but​ ​met​ ​little​ ​success.​ ​By​ ​late​ ​2002,​ ​the 
international​ ​community​ ​was​ ​aware​ ​that​ ​Libya​ ​repeatedly​ ​received​ ​illegal​ ​shipments​ ​of 
technology​ ​for​ ​the​ ​development​ ​weapons​ ​of​ ​mass​ ​destruction.​ ​In​ ​March​ ​2003,​ ​Libyan 
intelligence​ ​officials​ ​approached​ ​British​ ​officials​ ​to​ ​propose​ ​entering​ ​negotiations​ ​to​ ​dismantle 
Libya’s​ ​WMD​ ​program,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​new​ ​round​ ​of​ ​negotiations​ ​were​ ​established​ ​between​ ​British, 
Libyan,​ ​and​ ​US​ ​officials​ ​(Indyck​ ​2004).  
In​ ​response​ ​to​ ​Libya’s​ ​disarmament​ ​efforts​ ​and​ ​Gaddafi’s​ ​renunciation​ ​of​ ​terrorism,​ ​in 
2004​ ​the​ ​US​ ​terminated​ ​Libya’s​ ​subjection​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Iran-Libya​ ​Sanctions​ ​Act,​ ​lifted​ ​most​ ​of​ ​its 
remaining​ ​travel​ ​and​ ​trade​ ​sanctions​ ​on​ ​Libya,​ ​ended​ ​the​ ​national​ ​emergency,​ ​ended​ ​the​ ​freeze​ ​of 
Libyan​ ​assets,​ ​and​ ​allowed​ ​the​ ​import​ ​of​ ​Libyan​ ​oil​ ​into​ ​the​ ​US.​ ​In​ ​May​ ​2005,​ ​the​ ​Bush 
administration​ ​removed​ ​Libya​ ​from​ ​the​ ​list​ ​of​ ​state​ ​sponsors​ ​of​ ​terrorism​ ​and​ ​announced​ ​full 














Factor​ ​1: ​ ​Perception​ ​of​ ​Economic​ ​Gains​ ​in​ ​Libya 
Libya’s​ ​economy​ ​is​ ​almost​ ​entirely​ ​reliant​ ​on​ ​oil​ ​and​ ​gas​ ​exports,​ ​so​ ​it​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​that​ ​oil 
was​ ​perceived​ ​by​ ​elites​ ​and​ ​the​ ​public​ ​alike​ ​as​ ​a​ ​potential​ ​economic​ ​benefit​ ​of​ ​strengthening​ ​a 
US-Libyan​ ​relations.​ ​Libya​ ​experienced​ ​a​ ​rise​ ​of​ ​200​ ​million​ ​exported​ ​oil​ ​barrels​ ​per​ ​day 
between​ ​2000​ ​and​ ​2004,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​a​ ​29%​ ​growth​ ​in​ ​trade​ ​from​ ​2002​ ​to​ ​2003​ ​(International 
Monetary​ ​Fund​ ​2017).​ ​American​ ​interest​ ​in​ ​new​ ​sources​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​oil​ ​during​ ​Bush’s​ ​first 
presidential​ ​term​ ​is​ ​understandable​ ​given​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Iraq​ ​War;​ ​after​ ​years​ ​of​ ​a​ ​consistent 
annual​ ​rise​ ​in​ ​oil​ ​imports​ ​from​ ​Iraq,​ ​the​ ​years​ ​2000,​ ​2001,​ ​and​ ​2003​ ​experienced​ ​the​ ​largest 
fluctuations,​ ​including​ ​the​ ​largest​ ​drops,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​past​ ​two​ ​decades​ ​(US​ ​Energy​ ​Information 
Administration​ ​2017).​ ​This​ ​inconsistency​ ​would​ ​form​ ​a​ ​political​ ​environment​ ​concerned​ ​about 
oil​ ​importers.​ ​Concern​ ​about​ ​energy​ ​among​ ​the​ ​American​ ​public,​ ​however,​ ​was​ ​at​ ​a​ ​record​ ​low, 
with​ ​only​ ​22%​ ​of​ ​Americans​ ​reporting​ ​they​ ​believed​ ​the​ ​energy​ ​situation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​US​ ​was​ ​very 
serious​ ​in​ ​2002​ ​(Newport​ ​2017).  
The​ ​national​ ​economic​ ​interest​ ​in​ ​oil​ ​among​ ​elites​ ​was​ ​present​ ​from​ ​the​ ​earliest 
discussions​ ​future​ ​of​ ​US-Libyan​ ​relations.​ ​On​ ​February​ ​26,​ ​2004,​ ​two​ ​months​ ​after​ ​US-Libyan 
rapprochement​ ​began,​ ​in​ ​a​ ​hearing​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Senate​ ​Committee​ ​on​ ​Foreign​ ​Relations​ ​titled 
“Libya-​ ​Next​ ​Steps​ ​in​ ​US​ ​Relations,”​ ​Assistant​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​State​ ​William​ ​Burns​ ​informed​ ​the 
committee​ ​of​ ​the​ ​low​ ​cost,​ ​high​ ​quality,​ ​and​ ​magnitude​ ​of​ ​Libya’s​ ​oil​ ​reserves,​ ​citing​ ​research 
that​ ​concluded​ ​Libya​ ​was​ ​the​ ​second​ ​best​ ​oil​ ​and​ ​gas​ ​prospect​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world.​ ​Burns​ ​stated​ ​with 
confidence​ ​there​ ​was​ ​enormous​ ​interest​ ​in​ ​Libya​ ​among​ ​American​ ​oil​ ​companies.​ ​On​ ​March​ ​16, 
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speak​ ​about​ ​the​ ​developing​ ​opportunities​ ​to​ ​access​ ​Libyan​ ​oil​ ​and​ ​about​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​early​ ​in 
2003​ ​Gaddafi​ ​had​ ​called​ ​on​ ​other​ ​Arab​ ​oil-producing​ ​states​ ​to​ ​invoke​ ​an​ ​oil​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​the​ ​US. 
Burns​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​preparing​ ​for​ ​this​ ​embargo​ ​had​ ​“given​ ​way​ ​to​ ​plans​ ​for​ ​doubling​ ​Libyan​ ​oil 
production​ ​in​ ​the​ ​next​ ​few​ ​years,”​ ​which​ ​considering​ ​the​ ​11​ ​new​ ​oil​ ​exploration​ ​contracts​ ​in 
Libya​ ​won​ ​by​ ​US​ ​firms​ ​at​ ​that​ ​point,​ ​was​ ​a​ ​good​ ​sign​ ​for​ ​US​ ​oil​ ​imports​ ​from​ ​Libya. 
Not​ ​only​ ​were​ ​Congress​ ​and​ ​the​ ​State​ ​Department​ ​open​ ​about​ ​interest​ ​in​ ​Libyan​ ​oil, 
President​ ​Bush​ ​publicly​ ​spoke​ ​about​ ​Libyan​ ​oil​ ​before​ ​rapprochement​ ​began.​ ​In​ ​2001,​ ​Bush​ ​was 
asked​ ​if​ ​the​ ​US​ ​should​ ​look​ ​at​ ​easing​ ​economic​ ​sanctions​ ​on​ ​Iran,​ ​Iraq,​ ​and​ ​Libya​ ​in​ ​the​ ​interest 
of​ ​importing​ ​more​ ​oil​ ​into​ ​the​ ​US.​ ​Bush​ ​responded​ ​he​ ​had​ ​“no​ ​intention​ ​as​ ​of​ ​this​ ​moment​ ​for 
taking​ ​sanctions​ ​off​ ​of​ ​countries​ ​like​ ​Iran​ ​or​ ​Libya…”​ ​(George​ ​W.​ ​Bush​ ​2001).​ ​This​ ​response​ ​is 
committed​ ​to​ ​the​ ​UN​ ​Resolutions​ ​on​ ​Libya’s​ ​sanctions​ ​and​ ​does​ ​not​ ​demonstrate​ ​any​ ​urgent 
interest​ ​in​ ​Libya’s​ ​oil.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​the​ ​a​ ​reporter​ ​chose​ ​to​ ​ask​ ​this​ ​question​ ​not​ ​only 
demonstrates​ ​an​ ​existing​ ​speculation​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​would​ ​alter​ ​its​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​a​ ​hostile​ ​state​ ​to 
pursue​ ​an​ ​economic​ ​interest,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​also​ ​suggests​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​perception​ ​that​ ​prioritizes​ ​US 
economic​ ​interests​ ​more​ ​than​ ​commitment​ ​to​ ​international​ ​agreements.​ ​Similarly,​ ​a​ ​2002 
interview​ ​for​ ​the​ ​​Wall​ ​Street​ ​Journal​ ​​asked​ ​Bush​ ​if​ ​he​ ​was​ ​concerned​ ​about​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of 
losing​ ​oil​ ​import​ ​partners​ ​and​ ​if​ ​Libya​ ​could​ ​ever​ ​be​ ​a​ ​viable​ ​source​ ​of​ ​oil​ ​for​ ​the​ ​US.​ ​Bush 
responded,​ ​“Well​ ​it​ ​could,​ ​absolutely.”​ ​It​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​Bush​ ​intended​ ​this​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​be​ ​supportive 
of​ ​US​ ​energy​ ​policy​ ​reform​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​encourage​ ​“diversification​ ​away​ ​from​ ​places​ ​like​ ​Iraq” 
(George​ ​W.​ ​Bush​ ​2002);​ ​however,​ ​the​ ​president’s​ ​initial​ ​response​ ​of​ ​“absolutely”​ ​demonstrates 













Factor​ ​2: ​ ​International​ ​Pressure​ ​to​ ​Normalize​ ​Relations​ ​with​ ​Libya 
At​ ​the​ ​time​ ​of​ ​the​ ​beginning​ ​negotiations​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Libya,​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy, 
especially​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Middle​ ​East,​ ​was​ ​viewed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Iraq​ ​War.​ ​Global​ ​attitudes​ ​toward 
the​ ​US​ ​worsened​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Bush​ ​administration's​ ​actions​ ​in​ ​Iraq;​ ​from​ ​2000​ ​to​ ​2002,​ ​the 
percent​ ​of​ ​populations​ ​with​ ​a​ ​favorable​ ​view​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US​ ​decreased​ ​in​ ​twenty​ ​out​ ​of​ ​twenty-seven 
countries​ ​studied.​ ​Notably,​ ​favorability​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US​ ​in​ ​allies​ ​Argentina,​ ​Germany,​ ​and​ ​Turkey​ ​fell 
by​ ​16,​ ​17,​ ​and​ ​22​ ​points​ ​respectively​ ​in​ ​that​ ​two​ ​year​ ​period.​ ​75%​ ​of​ ​French​ ​respondents,​ ​54%​ ​of 
Germans,​ ​and​ ​44%​ ​of​ ​British​ ​respondents​ ​believed​ ​the​ ​US​ ​used​ ​force​ ​in​ ​Iraq​ ​to​ ​control​ ​Iraqi​ ​oil 
(Heimlich​ ​2002).​ ​After​ ​the​ ​2003​ ​invasion​ ​of​ ​Iraq,​ ​anti-American​ ​and​ ​anti-Bush​ ​sentiments 
flourished.​ ​French​ ​and​ ​German​ ​leaders​ ​spoke​ ​against​ ​the​ ​Iraq​ ​War​ ​at​ ​the​ ​United​ ​Nations,​ ​and​ ​UN 
Secretary-General​ ​Kofi​ ​Annan​ ​described​ ​the​ ​war​ ​as​ ​illegal​ ​(MacAskill​ ​2004).​ ​This​ ​unpopularity 
amongst​ ​US​ ​allies​ ​and​ ​the​ ​larger​ ​international​ ​community​ ​created​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​for​ ​the 
Bush​ ​administration​ ​to​ ​succeed​ ​in​ ​nonproliferation​ ​and​ ​counterterrorism​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Middle​ ​East​ ​in 
order​ ​to ​ ​justify​ ​its​ ​hardline​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​Iraq.  
As​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Libya​ ​began,​ ​Bush​ ​and​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​frequently​ ​cited​ ​it​ ​as​ ​an 
example​ ​of​ ​larger​ ​success​ ​in​ ​the​ ​region,​ ​made​ ​possible​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Iraq​ ​War.​ ​In​ ​three​ ​different​ ​public 
statements​ ​in​ ​January​ ​2004,​ ​Bush​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​Libya​ ​chose​ ​to​ ​give​ ​up​ ​its​ ​weapons​ ​of​ ​mass 
destruction​ ​and​ ​renounce​ ​terrorism​ ​because​ ​the​ ​invasion​ ​of​ ​Iraq​ ​gave​ ​the​ ​US​ ​credibility:​ ​“Nine 
months​ ​of​ ​intense​ ​negotiations...succeeded​ ​with​ ​Libya,​ ​while​ ​twelve​ ​years​ ​of​ ​diplomacy​ ​did​ ​not 
[with​ ​Iraq].​ ​And​ ​one​ ​reason​ ​is​ ​clear:​ ​For​ ​diplomacy​ ​to​ ​be​ ​effective,​ ​words​ ​must​ ​be​ ​credible,​ ​and 
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and​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Libya,​ ​then,​ ​could​ ​justify​ ​the​ ​US​ ​position​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Iraq.​ ​Similarly, 
Assistant​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​State​ ​Paula​ ​DeSutter​ ​testified​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Senate​ ​Foreign​ ​Relations 
Committee​ ​on​ ​February​ ​26,​ ​2004​ ​attributes​ ​Libya’s​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​disarm​ ​to​ ​the​ ​efforts​ ​the​ ​State 
Department​ ​made​ ​to​ ​change​ ​the​ ​“cost-benefit​ ​calculations​ ​of​ ​proliferators​ ​and​ ​would-be 
proliferators​ ​around​ ​the​ ​world.”​ ​As​ ​a​ ​senator​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Foreign​ ​Relations​ ​Committee,​ ​Joe​ ​Biden 
agreed​ ​with​ ​DeSutter​ ​and​ ​stated​ ​that​ ​the​ ​agreement​ ​with​ ​Libya​ ​could​ ​represent​ ​a​ ​model​ ​for​ ​future 
relations​ ​with​ ​other​ ​rogue​ ​states,​ ​demonstrating​ ​an​ ​understanding​ ​that​ ​improving​ ​relations​ ​with 
Libya​ ​would​ ​help​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​other​ ​US​ ​bilateral​ ​relations.  
Case​ ​2:​ ​The​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Vietnam 
Background 
​ ​US-Vietnamese​ ​diplomatic​ ​relations​ ​were​ ​severed​ ​in​ ​1975​ ​when​ ​the​ ​DVR​ ​took​ ​Saigon​ ​in 
the​ ​Vietnam​ ​War,​ ​and​ ​US​ ​tightened​ ​the​ ​trade​ ​restrictions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​Vietnam.​ ​After​ ​the 
war​ ​ended,​ ​the​ ​first​ ​attempts​ ​at​ ​diplomatic​ ​normalization​ ​occurred​ ​under​ ​President​ ​Carter​ ​in 
1977.​ ​These​ ​negotiations​ ​failed​ ​in​ ​1978,​ ​when​ ​Vietnam​ ​signified​ ​continued​ ​hostility​ ​towards​ ​the 
US​ ​by​ ​signing​ ​a​ ​security​ ​pact​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union.​ ​Between​ ​1978​ ​and​ ​1989,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​held​ ​little 
interest​ ​in​ ​normalizing​ ​bilateral​ ​relations​ ​because​ ​Vietnam​ ​was​ ​aligned​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union, 
was​ ​occupying​ ​Cambodia​ ​militarily,​ ​and​ ​was​ ​not​ ​cooperating​ ​on​ ​issues​ ​concerning​ ​prisoners​ ​of 
war​ ​(Brown​ ​2010,​ ​350). 
​ ​When​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union​ ​collapsed​ ​in​ ​1989,​ ​Vietnam​ ​lost​ ​its​ ​major​ ​trading​ ​partner​ ​and​ ​its 
promise​ ​of​ ​security,​ ​which​ ​led​ ​it​ ​to​ ​withdraw​ ​its​ ​military​ ​from​ ​Cambodia.​ ​In​ ​response, 













for​ ​political​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​development​ ​in​ ​Vietnam​ ​in​ ​return​ ​for​ ​Vietnam’s​ ​cooperation​ ​in​ ​the 
UN-supported​ ​peace​ ​settlement​ ​for​ ​Cambodia.​ ​Vietnam​ ​cooperated​ ​with​ ​these​ ​terms​ ​between 
1991​ ​and​ ​1993,​ ​signifying​ ​a​ ​willingness​ ​toward​ ​compromise​ ​and​ ​cooperation.​ ​In​ ​1993,​ ​the​ ​US 
Senate​ ​cleared​ ​the​ ​way​ ​for​ ​Vietnam​ ​to​ ​receive​ ​aid​ ​from​ ​the​ ​IMF​ ​and​ ​World​ ​Bank,​ ​and​ ​President 
Clinton​ ​officially​ ​lifted​ ​the​ ​trade​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​Vietnam​ ​in​ ​1994.​ ​Official​ ​rapprochement​ ​was 
announced,​ ​and​ ​embassies​ ​were​ ​opened​ ​in​ ​1995,​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​prisoners​ ​of​ ​war​ ​issues 
were​ ​still​ ​unresolved​ ​and​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​a​ ​major​ ​obstacle​ ​for​ ​normalizing​ ​relations.​ ​Throughout​ ​the 
early​ ​2000s,​ ​there​ ​were​ ​successful​ ​diplomatic​ ​visits​ ​between​ ​the​ ​two​ ​countries,​ ​aid​ ​and​ ​trade 
increased.​ ​Despite​ ​these​ ​improvements​ ​in​ ​relations,​ ​human​ ​rights​ ​remained​ ​an​ ​obstacle​ ​in 
US-Vietnamese​ ​rapprochement.​ ​In​ ​2004,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​declared​ ​Vietnam​ ​a​ ​Country​ ​of​ ​Particular 
Concern​ ​because​ ​of​ ​their​ ​human​ ​rights​ ​abuses​ ​(Brown​ ​2010,​ ​321). 
Significant​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​US-Vietnamese​ ​relations​ ​were​ ​made​ ​during​ ​Obama’s 
administration.​ ​In​ ​2014,​ ​Obama​ ​eased​ ​restrictions​ ​of​ ​an​ ​arms​ ​ban​ ​which​ ​originated​ ​from​ ​the 
Vietnam​ ​War,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​2016,​ ​Obama​ ​fully​ ​lifted​ ​the​ ​arms​ ​embargo​ ​despite​ ​little​ ​progress​ ​on​ ​the 
human​ ​rights​ ​issues​ ​in​ ​Vietnam.​ ​Obama​ ​continued​ ​to​ ​significantly​ ​build​ ​military​ ​ties​ ​with 
Vietnam​ ​for​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​his​ ​administration​ ​(Harris​ ​2016). 
Factor​ ​1: ​ ​Perception​ ​of​ ​Economic​ ​Gains​ ​in​ ​Vietnam 
In​ ​a​ ​1993​ ​speech,​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​State​ ​Warren​ ​Christopher​ ​stated​ ​there​ ​were​ ​“strong 
business​ ​incentives”​ ​for​ ​improved​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Vietnam.​ ​Prominent​ ​US​ ​companies,​ ​including 
Citibank,​ ​Bank​ ​of​ ​America,​ ​General​ ​Electric,​ ​Caterpillar,​ ​and​ ​Mobil​ ​Oil​ ​lobbied​ ​Congress​ ​for 
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2010,​ ​321).​ ​They​ ​were​ ​correct​ ​in​ ​their​ ​assessment​ ​of​ ​Vietnam’s​ ​economic​ ​success;​ ​between​ ​1991 
and​ ​1993,​ ​Vietnam’s​ ​private​ ​sector​ ​grew​ ​by​ ​about​ ​$1.5​ ​billion​ ​which​ ​marked​ ​its​ ​most​ ​significant 
growth​ ​since​ ​1985​ ​and​ ​one​ ​of​ ​two​ ​periods​ ​of​ ​growth​ ​in​ ​the​ ​past​ ​three​ ​decades​ ​(World​ ​Bank 
2017).​ ​These​ ​companies​ ​were​ ​concerned​ ​other​ ​states​ ​would​ ​invest​ ​in​ ​Vietnam​ ​and​ ​US​ ​businesses 
would​ ​be​ ​left​ ​out​ ​because​ ​of​ ​US​ ​economic​ ​sanctions.​ ​This​ ​pressure​ ​from​ ​the​ ​business​ ​community 
soon​ ​outweighed​ ​the​ ​​ ​(Fehrs​ ​2016,​ ​143).​ ​This​ ​is​ ​a​ ​key​ ​reason​ ​for​ ​lifting​ ​the​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​Vietnam 
just​ ​one​ ​year​ ​after​ ​rapprochement​ ​began​ ​and​ ​before​ ​the​ ​settlement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​prisoners​ ​of​ ​war​ ​issue.  
When​ ​Clinton​ ​announced​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​trade​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​Vietnam,​ ​he​ ​was​ ​asked​ ​if​ ​the 
decision​ ​was​ ​giving​ ​up​ ​leverage​ ​over​ ​Vietnam​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to​ ​their​ ​unresolved​ ​issues,​ ​to​ ​which​ ​he 
responded​ ​that​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​ending​ ​the​ ​embargo​ ​was​ ​to​ ​make​ ​positive​ ​steps​ ​toward​ ​resolving 
those​ ​issues.​ ​He​ ​was​ ​then​ ​asked​ ​about​ ​the​ ​size​ ​and​ ​opportunities​ ​of​ ​Vietnam’s​ ​market,​ ​and​ ​he 
responded​ ​that​ ​he​ ​knew​ ​nothing​ ​of​ ​Vietnam’s​ ​market:​ ​“​I​ ​wanted​ ​to​ ​make​ ​sure​ ​that​ ​the​ ​trade 
questions​ ​did​ ​not​ ​enter​ ​into​ ​this​ ​decision.​ ​I​ ​never​ ​had​ ​a​ ​briefing​ ​on​ ​it,​ ​and​ ​we​ ​never​ ​had​ ​a 
discussion​ ​about​ ​it”​ ​(William​ ​Clinton​ ​1994).​ ​While​ ​Clinton​ ​may​ ​have​ ​wanted​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​discussions 
of​ ​new​ ​trade​ ​possibilities​ ​separate​ ​from​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​end​ ​the​ ​embargo​ ​itself,​ ​this​ ​question​ ​and 
Clinton’s​ ​preparedness​ ​for​ ​this​ ​question​ ​demonstrate​ ​that​ ​the​ ​president,​ ​US​ ​businesses,​ ​and​ ​the 
media​ ​perceived​ ​real​ ​economic​ ​benefits​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time​ ​of​ ​significant​ ​steps​ ​toward​ ​rapprochement.  
Obama’s​ ​administration​ ​also​ ​saw​ ​increased​ ​economic​ ​opportunities​ ​in​ ​Vietnam​ ​at​ ​the 
time​ ​that​ ​Obama​ ​loosened​ ​and​ ​then​ ​ended​ ​the​ ​arms​ ​embargo.​ ​From​ ​2010​ ​to​ ​2014​ ​private​ ​sector 
investment​ ​and​ ​trade​ ​in​ ​Vietnam​ ​increased​ ​by​ ​$60​ ​billion,​ ​the​ ​sharpest​ ​increase​ ​Vietnam​ ​has 













Obama​ ​stated​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​was​ ​currently​ ​the​ ​seventh​ ​largest​ ​investor​ ​in​ ​Vietnam,​ ​but​ ​he​ ​hoped​ ​the 
US​ ​would ​ ​become​ ​the​ ​first​ ​largest​ ​investor.​ ​He​ ​claimed​ ​this​ ​was​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​goals​ ​of​ ​the 
Trans-Pacific​ ​Partnership​ ​(Barack​ ​Obama​ ​2016).  
Factor​ ​2: ​ ​International​ ​Pressure​ ​to​ ​Normalize​ ​Relations​ ​with​ ​Vietnam 
When​ ​Clinton​ ​began​ ​normalizing​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​in​ ​1994-1995,​ ​there​ ​was​ ​not 
significant,​ ​clear​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​do​ ​so.​ ​In​ ​his​ ​remarks​ ​regarding​ ​lifting​ ​the​ ​trade 
embargo​ ​February​ ​3,​ ​1994,​ ​Clinton​ ​attributed​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​only​ ​to​ ​progress​ ​on​ ​domestic 
concerns.​ ​In​ ​his​ ​declaration​ ​of​ ​normalized​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​on​ ​July​ ​11,​ ​1995,​ ​Clinton 
mentioned​ ​“bringing​ ​Vietnam​ ​into​ ​the​ ​community​ ​of​ ​nations,”​ ​and​ ​“working​ ​for​ ​a​ ​free​ ​and 
peaceful​ ​Vietnam​ ​in​ ​stable​ ​and​ ​peaceful​ ​Asia,”​ ​but​ ​this​ ​is​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​of​ ​his​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​the 
international​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​what​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​could​ ​mean​ ​for​ ​the​ ​international 
system​ ​(William​ ​Clinton​ ​1995).  
Pressure​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​rapprochement​ ​and​ ​reverse​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​created​ ​by​ ​the​ ​international 
system​ ​is​ ​much​ ​easier​ ​to​ ​identify​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration.​ ​China’s​ ​growing​ ​power​ ​and 
assertiveness​ ​in​ ​Southeast​ ​Asia​ ​influenced​ ​Obama​ ​to​ ​“pivot”​ ​to​ ​Asia​ ​and​ ​strengthen​ ​military​ ​ties 
in​ ​the​ ​region,​ ​including​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​(Brown​ ​2010,​ ​330).​ ​In​ ​his​ ​May​ ​2016​ ​press​ ​conference​ ​with 
President​ ​Quang,​ ​Obama​ ​stated​ ​that​ ​both​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Vietnam​ ​were​ ​committed​ ​regional​ ​order​ ​in 
the​ ​South​ ​China​ ​Sea​ ​(Barack​ ​Obama​ ​2016),​ ​which​ ​China​ ​increasingly​ ​encroached​ ​into​ ​over​ ​the 
course​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration.​ ​When​ ​asked​ ​if​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​arms​ ​embargo​ ​was​ ​related​ ​to 
China’s​ ​increased​ ​assertiveness,​ ​Obama​ ​claimed​ ​it​ ​was​ ​not.​ ​However,​ ​​Nguyen​ ​Ngoc​ ​Truong, 
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development​ ​was​ ​symbolic​ ​of​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​“development​ ​of​ ​strategic​ ​partnership,”​ ​and​ ​that​ ​“China 
should​ ​think​ ​twice​ ​over​ ​anything​ ​they​ ​can​ ​do​ ​to​ ​Vietnam​ ​or​ ​the​ ​South​ ​China​ ​Sea”​ ​(Liptack 
2016).​ ​By​ ​improving​ ​it​ ​relationship​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​and​ ​ending​ ​the​ ​arms​ ​embargo,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​could 
strengthen​ ​its​ ​military​ ​ties​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​its​ ​military​ ​presence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​region​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to 
combat​ ​China’s​ ​growth​ ​as​ ​a​ ​hegemon. 
Case​ ​3:​ ​The​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Cuba 
Background 
In​ ​May​ ​1959,​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​empowered​ ​Castro​ ​regime​ ​enacted​ ​the​ ​Agrarian​ ​Reform​ ​Law 
which​ ​expropriated​ ​land​ ​owned​ ​by​ ​US​ ​businesses​ ​and​ ​compensated​ ​them​ ​for​ ​the​ ​value​ ​they​ ​had 
reported​ ​on​ ​their​ ​taxes.​ ​In​ ​response,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​established​ ​an​ ​economic​ ​embargo​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​banning 
all​ ​trade​ ​except​ ​for​ ​food​ ​and​ ​medicine​ ​in​ ​1960,​ ​and​ ​President​ ​Eisenhower​ ​authorized​ ​the​ ​CIA​ ​to 
train​ ​Cuban​ ​refugees​ ​to​ ​overthrow​ ​the​ ​Castro​ ​regime.​ ​In​ ​1961​ ​the​ ​US​ ​severed​ ​all​ ​diplomatic 
relations​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​in​ ​an​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​economically​ ​sabotage​ ​Fidel​ ​Castro’s​ ​regime​ ​and​ ​ultimately 
cause​ ​the​ ​failure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​socialist​ ​revolution​ ​from​ ​within.​ ​Later​ ​that​ ​year,​ ​President​ ​Kennedy​ ​sent 
trained​ ​Cuban​ ​refugees​ ​to​ ​invade​ ​Cuba​ ​through​ ​the​ ​Bay​ ​of​ ​Pigs,​ ​an​ ​embarrassing​ ​failure​ ​for​ ​the 
US.​ ​After​ ​the​ ​invasion,​ ​Castro​ ​deepened​ ​Cuba’s​ ​ties​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of 
security​ ​and​ ​defense,​ ​which​ ​led​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Cuban​ ​Missile​ ​Crisis​ ​of​ ​1962.​ ​In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​Cuba’s 
economic​ ​collapse​ ​and​ ​damage​ ​the​ ​Castro​ ​regime,​ ​after​ ​the​ ​fall​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union​ ​the​ ​US 
Congress​ ​passed​ ​the​ ​Helms-Burton​ ​Act​ ​which​ ​made​ ​the​ ​embargo​ ​federal​ ​law​ ​that​ ​only​ ​Congress 













In​ ​2009,​ ​Obama​ ​lifted​ ​all​ ​restrictions​ ​on​ ​family​ ​travel​ ​and​ ​remittances​ ​to​ ​Cuba,​ ​and​ ​he 
loosened​ ​general​ ​travel​ ​restrictions.​ ​Two​ ​years​ ​later,​ ​he​ ​allowed​ ​non-family​ ​remittances​ ​to​ ​Cuba 
and​ ​allowed​ ​some​ ​flights​ ​to​ ​Cuba.​ ​In​ ​2014,​ ​Cuba​ ​and​ ​the​ ​US​ ​released​ ​all​ ​remaining​ ​prisoners, 
and​ ​the​ ​two​ ​countries​ ​announced​ ​they​ ​would​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​normalize​ ​US-Cuban​ ​relations.​ ​Cuba​ ​was 
removed​ ​from​ ​the​ ​list​ ​of​ ​state​ ​sponsors​ ​of​ ​terrorism​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​commercial​ ​flights​ ​between​ ​Cuba 
and​ ​the​ ​US​ ​were​ ​restored,​ ​some​ ​trade​ ​restrictions​ ​were​ ​loosened​ ​on​ ​major​ ​Cuban​ ​exports.​ ​In 
2016​ ​Obama​ ​visited​ ​Cuba,​ ​becoming​ ​the​ ​first​ ​US​ ​president​ ​to​ ​visit​ ​in​ ​85​ ​years​ ​and​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same 
year​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​officially​ ​reopened​ ​their​ ​embassies.  
Factor​ ​1: ​ ​Perception​ ​of​ ​Economic​ ​Gains​ ​in​ ​Cuba 
Since​ ​2008,​ ​Cuba​ ​made​ ​significant​ ​efforts​ ​towards​ ​reform​ ​in​ ​an​ ​effort​ ​to​ ​restore​ ​Cuba’s 
economy​ ​after​ ​the​ ​Special​ ​Period​ ​of​ ​particular​ ​hardship​ ​occurred​ ​when​ ​the​ ​Soviet​ ​Union 
collapsed.​ ​Raul​ ​Castro’s​ ​regime​ ​pursued​ ​market​ ​socialism​ ​by​ ​expanding​ ​the​ ​small​ ​private​ ​sector 
as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​restructuring​ ​and​ ​diversifying​ ​agricultural​ ​market​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​decrease​ ​Cuba’s​ ​foreign 
food​ ​dependency​ ​(LeoGrande​ ​2015,​ ​478).​ ​These​ ​reforms​ ​have​ ​inspired​ ​US​ ​businesses,​ ​especially 
in​ ​agriculture​ ​and​ ​tourism,​ ​who​ ​desperately​ ​want​ ​to​ ​reach​ ​Cuba’s​ ​untapped​ ​market,​ ​because​ ​this 
development​ ​made​ ​legal​ ​trade​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​possible​ ​through​ ​small​ ​private​ ​Cuban​ ​businesses.  
Perception​ ​of​ ​significant​ ​economic​ ​opportunity​ ​was​ ​high​ ​among​ ​the​ ​president​ ​and​ ​the 
Congress.​ ​After​ ​Obama​ ​loosened​ ​restrictions​ ​on​ ​remittances​ ​in​ ​2009,​ ​he​ ​wrote​ ​an​ ​op-ed​ ​entitled 
“Choosing​ ​a​ ​Better​ ​Future​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Americas”​ ​in​ ​which​ ​he​ ​argued​ ​advancing​ ​prosperity​ ​throughout 
the​ ​western ​ ​hemisphere,​ ​including​ ​in​ ​Cuba,​ ​would​ ​help​ ​the​ ​US​ ​confront​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​crisis​ ​of 
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from​ ​US​ ​businesses​ ​to​ ​work​ ​in​ ​Cuba,​ ​but​ ​nearly​ ​every​ ​time​ ​he​ ​spoke​ ​about​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​in 
regards​ ​to​ ​Cuba,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​framed​ ​to​ ​mean​ ​Cubans,​ ​not​ ​Americans,​ ​would​ ​benefit​ ​economically.​ ​At 
Obama’s​ ​historic​ ​first​ ​visit​ ​to​ ​Cuba,​ ​he​ ​brought​ ​with​ ​him​ ​dozens​ ​of​ ​US​ ​business​ ​leaders​ ​to 
demonstrate​ ​the​ ​interest​ ​and​ ​commitment​ ​the​ ​US​ ​had​ ​in​ ​working​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Cuban​ ​people​ ​(Barack 
Obama​ ​2016).​ ​In​ ​a​ ​Congressional​ ​hearing​ ​before​ ​the​ ​House​ ​Committee​ ​on​ ​Foreign​ ​Affairs​ ​on 
February​ ​4,​ ​2015,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​discussed​ ​whether​ ​improving​ ​the​ ​US​ ​relationship​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​was​ ​to 
benefit​ ​Cuban​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​or​ ​US​ ​economic​ ​interests;​ ​the​ ​testifying​ ​witness​ ​answered​ ​it 
was​ ​for​ ​the​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​both​ ​countries,​ ​but​ ​when​ ​she​ ​was​ ​pressed​ ​to​ ​choose,​ ​she​ ​chose​ ​the 
economic​ ​interests​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US.  
It​ ​is​ ​also​ ​important​ ​to​ ​note​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Cuba-American​ ​demographic​ ​in​ ​has​ ​Florida​ ​changed 
after​ ​the​ ​second​ ​and​ ​third​ ​waves​ ​of​ ​Cuban​ ​immigration​ ​to​ ​the​ ​US​ ​in​ ​1980​ ​and​ ​1994.​ ​The 
Cuban-American​ ​demographic​ ​now​ ​is​ ​generally​ ​younger​ ​people​ ​who​ ​came​ ​to​ ​the​ ​US​ ​for 
economic​ ​opportunities,​ ​unlike​ ​the​ ​older​ ​Cuba​ ​lobby​ ​who​ ​came​ ​to​ ​escape​ ​persecution​ ​and​ ​who 
held​ ​powerful​ ​influence​ ​over​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​Cuba​ ​(Jiménez​ ​2012,​ ​367).​ ​This​ ​is​ ​important 
because​ ​it​ ​was​ ​a​ ​necessary​ ​shift​ ​that​ ​made​ ​the​ ​pursuit​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​in​ ​Cuba​ ​outweigh​ ​the 
domestic​ ​political​ ​costs.  
Factor​ ​2: ​ ​International​ ​Pressure​ ​to​ ​Normalize​ ​Relations​ ​with​ ​Cuba 
International​ ​pressure​ ​on​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to​ ​change​ ​its​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​Cuba​ ​was​ ​high,​ ​especially 
from​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​leaders.​ ​Latin​ ​America’s​ ​growing​ ​frustration​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​for​ ​isolating 
Cuba​ ​and​ ​attempting​ ​to​ ​dictate​ ​Latin​ ​America’s​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​could​ ​have​ ​led​ ​to 













(LeoGrande​ ​2015,​ ​483).​ ​Pressure​ ​applied​ ​by​ ​both​ ​leftist​ ​regimes​ ​and​ ​US​ ​allies​ ​in​ ​Latin​ ​America 
signify​ ​the​ ​mounting​ ​frustration​ ​toward​ ​the​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​of​ ​isolating​ ​Cuba​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Organization​ ​of 
American​ ​States​ ​(OAS)​ ​and​ ​Summits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Americas​ ​(LeoGrande​ ​2015,​ ​476).​ ​Some​ ​Latin 
American​ ​leaders,​ ​including​ ​close​ ​allies​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​refused​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​attend​ ​summits​ ​if​ ​the 
US​ ​policy​ ​of​ ​excluding​ ​Cuba​ ​from​ ​the​ ​summits​ ​did​ ​not​ ​change​ ​(LeoGrande​ ​2015,​ ​476).  
In​ ​Obama’s​ ​joint​ ​news​ ​conferences​ ​with​ ​Latin​ ​American​ ​leaders,​ ​almost​ ​all​ ​of​ ​the​ ​leaders 
recognize​ ​their​ ​differences​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Cuba​ ​issue​ ​and​ ​stated​ ​a​ ​hope​ ​that​ ​US-Cuban 
relations​ ​would​ ​improve.​ ​Mexico’s​ ​presidents​ ​stated​ ​repeatedly​ ​throughout​ ​Obama’s 
administration​ ​that​ ​Mexico​ ​was​ ​a​ ​friend​ ​of​ ​Cuba​ ​and​ ​wished​ ​to​ ​someday​ ​be​ ​a​ ​friend​ ​of​ ​both 
Cuba​ ​and​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​urging​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to​ ​end​ ​the​ ​embargo​ ​on​ ​Cuba​ ​(Barack​ ​Obama​ ​and​ ​Felipe​ ​de 
Jesus​ ​Calderon​ ​2009).​ ​After​ ​Obama​ ​loosened​ ​restrictions​ ​in​ ​2009​ ​and​ ​after​ ​he​ ​announced​ ​the 
beginning​ ​of​ ​normalization​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​in​ ​2014,​ ​he​ ​was​ ​met​ ​with​ ​much​ ​praise​ ​from​ ​leaders 
international​ ​leaders,​ ​including​ ​the​ ​UN​ ​Secretary​ ​General​ ​Ban​ ​Ki-moon,​ ​Canadian​ ​Prime 
Minister​ ​Justin​ ​Trudeau,​ ​Colombian​ ​President​ ​Juan​ ​Manuel​ ​Santos​ ​Calderon,​ ​and​ ​others.​ ​In​ ​an 
interview​ ​in​ ​2016,​ ​Obama​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​“restore[d]​ ​diplomatic​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Cuba​ ​in​ ​a 
way​ ​that​ ​didn't​ ​just​ ​transform​ ​our​ ​relationship​ ​with​ ​Cuba,​ ​but​ ​has​ ​put​ ​our​ ​relationship​ ​with​ ​all​ ​of 
Latin​ ​America​ ​on​ ​its​ ​strongest​ ​footing,​ ​maybe​ ​in​ ​history”​ ​(Barack​ ​Obama​ ​2016).​ ​This​ ​signifies 
that​ ​Obama​ ​had​ ​larger​ ​regional​ ​goals​ ​in​ ​mind​ ​when​ ​revisiting​ ​the​ ​US​ ​policy​ ​on​ ​Cuba.​ ​Finally,​ ​the 
growing​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​Iran,​ ​still​ ​a​ ​rival​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​in​ ​Latin​ ​America​ ​and​ ​in​ ​Cuba​ ​specifically 
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Case​ ​4:​ ​The​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran 
Background 
US-Iranian​ ​relations​ ​deteriorated​ ​in​ ​1979​ ​when​ ​Iran’s​ ​revolution​ ​forced​ ​the​ ​Shah​ ​to​ ​flee 
to​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Ayatollah​ ​Khomeini​ ​became​ ​the​ ​supreme​ ​religious​ ​leader.​ ​Students​ ​seized​ ​the​ ​US 
embassy​ ​in​ ​Tehran​ ​and​ ​held​ ​the​ ​American​ ​staff​ ​hostage​ ​demanding​ ​that​ ​the​ ​US​ ​return​ ​the​ ​Shah 
to​ ​Iran​ ​for​ ​trial.​ ​The​ ​US​ ​severed​ ​diplomatic​ ​ties​ ​with​ ​Iran,​ ​froze​ ​Iranian​ ​assets,​ ​and​ ​banned​ ​most 
trade​ ​with ​ ​Iran​ ​in​ ​1980.​ ​The​ ​hostages​ ​were​ ​released​ ​when​ ​Reagan​ ​was​ ​inaugurated​ ​in​ ​1981,​ ​but 
US-Iranian​ ​relations​ ​only​ ​worsened.​ ​The​ ​US​ ​identified​ ​Iran​ ​as​ ​a​ ​state​ ​sponsor​ ​of​ ​terrorism​ ​and 
passed​ ​the​ ​Iran-Iraq​ ​Arms​ ​Nonproliferation​ ​Act​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Iran-Libya​ ​Sanctions​ ​Act,​ ​imposing 
severe​ ​sanctions​ ​on​ ​Iran.​ ​The​ ​Reagan​ ​administration’s​ ​Iran-Contra​ ​negotiations​ ​led​ ​to​ ​a​ ​slight 
improvement​ ​in​ ​US-Iranian​ ​relations,​ ​but​ ​when​ ​the​ ​scandal​ ​was​ ​exposed​ ​relations​ ​soured​ ​again. 
Terrorist​ ​attacks​ ​on​ ​a​ ​US​ ​air​ ​base​ ​in​ ​1996​ ​were​ ​believed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​supported​ ​by​ ​Iran,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​US 
refrained​ ​from​ ​a​ ​military​ ​retaliation​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​war​ ​with​ ​Iran.  
An​ ​opportunity​ ​for​ ​US-Iranian​ ​rapprochement​ ​appeared​ ​when​ ​Mohammad​ ​Khatami​ ​was 
elected​ ​president​ ​of​ ​Iran​ ​in​ ​1997.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​CNN​ ​interview,​ ​Khatami​ ​spoke​ ​positively​ ​about​ ​the​ ​US 
and​ ​expressed​ ​desire​ ​open​ ​a​ ​new​ ​relationship;​ ​President​ ​Clinton​ ​returned​ ​the​ ​sentiment,​ ​and 
attempts​ ​at​ ​warming​ ​US-Iranian​ ​relations​ ​began.​ ​Some​ ​sanctions​ ​on​ ​Iranian​ ​goods​ ​were 
loosened,​ ​and​ ​while​ ​they​ ​did​ ​not​ ​meet​ ​with​ ​each​ ​other,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran​ ​talked​ ​directly​ ​in​ ​UN 
discussions​ ​centered​ ​on​ ​Afghanistan.​ ​The​ ​Clinton​ ​administration​ ​made​ ​several​ ​attempts​ ​at 
meeting​ ​with​ ​Iranian​ ​officials,​ ​but​ ​domestic​ ​pressure​ ​from​ ​anti-American​ ​hardliners​ ​in​ ​Iran 













people-to-people​ ​rapprochement.​ ​In​ ​2000,​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​State​ ​Albright​ ​apologized​ ​for​ ​the​ ​US 
involvement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1953​ ​Iranian​ ​coup,​ ​declared​ ​the​ ​lifting​ ​of​ ​some​ ​sanctions,​ ​and​ ​offered​ ​to​ ​settle 
legal​ ​claims​ ​on​ ​frozen​ ​Iranian​ ​assets.  
The​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​dissipated​ ​as​ ​Bush​ ​named​ ​Iran​ ​as​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“axis​ ​of 
evil”​ ​and​ ​Mahmoud​ ​Ahmadinejad,​ ​a​ ​hardline​ ​leader,​ ​became​ ​Iranian​ ​president​ ​in​ ​2005.​ ​The​ ​US 
Congress​ ​passed​ ​the​ ​Iran​ ​Nonproliferation​ ​Act​ ​in​ ​2000,​ ​allowing​ ​the​ ​president​ ​to​ ​punish 
individuals​ ​or​ ​groups​ ​known​ ​to​ ​be​ ​supplying​ ​Iran​ ​with​ ​nuclear​ ​materials.​ ​Between​ ​2005​ ​and 
2009,​ ​Iran​ ​made​ ​major​ ​developments​ ​towards​ ​creating​ ​nuclear​ ​weapons,​ ​and​ ​multilateral​ ​nuclear 
negotiations​ ​with​ ​Iran​ ​stall​ ​until​ ​2012.​ ​However,​ ​secret​ ​talks​ ​between​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran​ ​began​ ​in 
2012,​ ​continued​ ​in​ ​2013​ ​when​ ​Hassan​ ​Rouhani​ ​was​ ​elected​ ​Iran’s​ ​president,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​2015​ ​Iran 
and​ ​six​ ​powers​ ​including​ ​the​ ​US​ ​came​ ​to​ ​an​ ​agreement​ ​to​ ​reduce​ ​Iran’s​ ​nuclear​ ​power​ ​in​ ​return 
for​ ​easing​ ​multilateral​ ​and​ ​bilateral​ ​sanctions.​ ​As​ ​of​ ​2016,​ ​Iran​ ​has​ ​stayed​ ​true​ ​to​ ​the​ ​agreement, 
and​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nuclear​ ​deal​ ​allows​ ​for​ ​more​ ​possibilities​ ​for​ ​US-Iranian​ ​rapprochement. 
Factor​ ​1: ​ ​Perception​ ​of​ ​Economic​ ​Gains​ ​in​ ​Iran 
US​ ​officials​ ​saw​ ​some​ ​opportunity​ ​for​ ​economic​ ​gains​ ​in​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Iran​ ​but 
not​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​effectively​ ​improve​ ​diplomatic​ ​relations.​ ​Oil​ ​made​ ​up​ ​80%​ ​of​ ​Iran’s​ ​exports​ ​in​ ​the 
late​ ​1990s,​ ​and​ ​oil​ ​was​ ​understood​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​main​ ​economic​ ​benefit​ ​of​ ​cooperating​ ​with​ ​Iran. 
However,​ ​while​ ​some​ ​US​ ​oil​ ​companies​ ​pressed​ ​for​ ​access​ ​to​ ​Iranian​ ​oil,​ ​this​ ​pressure​ ​was 
relatively​ ​little​ ​and​ ​subdued.​ ​Trade​ ​with​ ​Iran​ ​lacked​ ​appeal​ ​for​ ​US​ ​businesses​ ​because​ ​of​ ​Iran’s 
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There​ ​was​ ​no​ ​significant​ ​change​ ​in​ ​oil​ ​production​ ​or​ ​economic​ ​growth​ ​in​ ​Iran​ ​between 
1994​ ​and​ ​1999​ ​(Energy​ ​Information​ ​Administration​ ​2017),​ ​and​ ​there​ ​was​ ​a​ ​decrease​ ​in 
Americans​ ​who​ ​believed​ ​the​ ​US​ ​energy​ ​situation​ ​was​ ​“very​ ​serious”​ ​between​ ​1996​ ​and​ ​1998, 
signifying ​ ​little​ ​to​ ​no​ ​incentive​ ​for​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​Iranian​ ​oil​ ​(Newport​ ​2017).​ ​Neither​ ​did 
Iran’s​ ​oil​ ​industry​ ​become​ ​more​ ​appealing​ ​when​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration​ ​began​ ​negotiating​ ​the 
nuclear​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​Iran;​ ​from​ ​2012​ ​to​ ​2014​ ​Iran’s​ ​oil​ ​production​ ​actually​ ​decreased​ ​by​ ​over​ ​one 
million​ ​barrels​ ​per​ ​day,​ ​its​ ​sharpest​ ​decrease​ ​since​ ​the​ ​1970s​ ​(Energy​ ​Information 
Administration).​ ​By​ ​the​ ​time​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration​ ​the​ ​US​ ​had​ ​become​ ​less​ ​reliant​ ​on 
foreign​ ​oil​ ​as​ ​it​ ​had​ ​increased​ ​oil​ ​production​ ​domestically.  
Speeches​ ​in​ ​Congressional​ ​committee​ ​hearings​ ​on​ ​Iran​ ​demonstrate​ ​a​ ​commitment​ ​to 
avoiding​ ​economic​ ​interaction​ ​with​ ​Iran.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​hearing​ ​before​ ​Senate​ ​Committee​ ​on​ ​Foreign 
Relations​ ​on​ ​April​ ​17,​ ​1997​ ​Senator​ ​Alfonse​ ​D’Amato​ ​of​ ​New​ ​York​ ​reminded​ ​the​ ​committee 
that​ ​the​ ​Iranian​ ​oil​ ​infrastructure​ ​was​ ​outdated​ ​and​ ​difficult​ ​to​ ​work​ ​with.​ ​He​ ​also​ ​expressed​ ​a 
desire​ ​to ​ ​end​ ​all​ ​backdoor​ ​imports​ ​of​ ​Iranian​ ​oil​ ​which​ ​occurred​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​Iran-Libya​ ​Sanctions 
Act.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​hearing​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Senate​ ​Committee​ ​on​ ​Foreign​ ​Relations​ ​on​ ​May​ ​14,​ ​1998,​ ​Middle 
East​ ​affairs​ ​analyst​ ​Steven​ ​Emerson​ ​reported​ ​to​ ​the​ ​committee​ ​that​ ​Khatami​ ​was​ ​elected​ ​because 
international​ ​sanctions​ ​on​ ​Iran​ ​had​ ​created​ ​discontent​ ​among​ ​the​ ​Iranian​ ​people,​ ​and​ ​therefore 
loosening​ ​sanctions​ ​would​ ​only​ ​re-solidify​ ​the​ ​power​ ​base​ ​of​ ​the​ ​radicals​ ​which​ ​the​ ​US​ ​wanted 
to​ ​keep​ ​out​ ​of​ ​power.​ ​In​ ​three​ ​different​ ​Congressional​ ​committee​ ​hearings​ ​between​ ​1997​ ​and 
1999,​ ​lengthy​ ​discussions​ ​were​ ​held​ ​on​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​persuading​ ​US​ ​allies​ ​to​ ​further​ ​limit 













economic​ ​interests​ ​in​ ​Iranian​ ​oil,​ ​the​ ​opposite​ ​was​ ​true;​ ​US​ ​elite​ ​perceived​ ​some​ ​amount​ ​of 
economic​ ​opportunity​ ​in​ ​Iran​ ​but​ ​decided​ ​it​ ​was​ ​in​ ​the​ ​national​ ​interest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​US​ ​not​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​it, 
at​ ​least ​ ​in​ ​part​ ​because​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​gains​ ​would​ ​have​ ​been​ ​minimal. 
Factor​ ​2: ​ ​International​ ​Pressure​ ​to​ ​Normalize​ ​Relations​ ​with​ ​Iran 
International​ ​pressure​ ​on​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Iran​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​rapprochement​ ​was​ ​low.​ ​Iran​ ​did​ ​not 
have​ ​significant​ ​motivation​ ​to​ ​concede​ ​to​ ​US​ ​demands,​ ​as​ ​Libya​ ​did​ ​in​ ​2003.​ ​The​ ​US​ ​historically 
sided​ ​with​ ​Iran’s​ ​opponents,​ ​namely​ ​with​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​Iraq​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Iran-Iraq​ ​war.​ ​Iran’s​ ​major​ ​threats 
in​ ​the​ ​international​ ​system,​ ​Russia​ ​and​ ​Iraq,​ ​had​ ​diminished,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​US​ ​became​ ​Iran’s​ ​most 
significant​ ​threat,​ ​providing​ ​little​ ​incentive​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​rapprochement​ ​(Fehrs​ ​2016,​ ​129).​ ​The​ ​US 
did​ ​not​ ​feel ​ ​significant​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Iran​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time​ ​because​ ​its 
international​ ​approval​ ​was​ ​relatively​ ​high​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​international​ ​community​ ​approved 
of​ ​isolating​ ​Iran​ ​(Bakare​ ​2016).  
International​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​change​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​Iran​ ​increased​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Obama 
administration,​ ​as​ ​Iran’s​ ​development​ ​as​ ​a​ ​nuclear​ ​power​ ​increased.​ ​Much​ ​about​ ​Iran’s​ ​nuclear 
program​ ​was​ ​not​ ​known​ ​until​ ​2009,​ ​but​ ​as​ ​the​ ​international​ ​community​ ​slowly​ ​learned​ ​more 
about​ ​Iran’s​ ​developing​ ​nuclear​ ​threat,​ ​engaging​ ​with​ ​Iran​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​relations​ ​became​ ​a​ ​security 
issue​ ​not​ ​just​ ​for​ ​the​ ​US,​ ​but​ ​for​ ​the​ ​European​ ​Union​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Middle​ ​East​ ​as​ ​a​ ​region​ ​(Kaya​ ​and 
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Table​ ​1: ​ ​Perceived​ ​Economic​ ​Interests​ ​and​ ​International​ ​Pressure  
Country 













Iran Clinton Medium Low No No 
Vietnam Clinton High Low Yes No 
Libya Bush High High Yes Yes 
Cuba Obama High High Yes No 
 
In​ ​each​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cases,​ ​both​ ​a​ ​high​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​for​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​high 
amount​ ​of​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​be​ ​required​ ​actual​ ​change​ ​in​ ​US​ ​foreign​ ​policy​ ​to​ ​occur 
and​ ​rapprochement​ ​to​ ​complete.​ ​The​ ​Libya​ ​case​ ​supports​ ​this​ ​interpretation,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Cuba​ ​case 
may​ ​as​ ​well​ ​if​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​continue​ ​on​ ​the​ ​path​ ​laid​ ​out​ ​for​ ​them​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Obama 
administration.​ ​It​ ​may​ ​be​ ​too​ ​soon​ ​to​ ​tell​ ​with​ ​Cuba,​ ​since​ ​the​ ​developments​ ​Obama​ ​made​ ​in 
US-Cuban​ ​relations​ ​may​ ​be​ ​reversed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​current​ ​president.  
The​ ​failure​ ​to​ ​implement​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​change​ ​in​ ​policy​ ​toward​ ​Iran​ ​during​ ​Clinton’s 
administration​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Obama​ ​administration​ ​suggests​ ​two​ ​things:​ ​first, 
international​ ​pressure​ ​on​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to​ ​make​ ​a​ ​change​ ​increases​ ​the​ ​likelihood​ ​that​ ​a​ ​significant 
change​ ​occurs.​ ​A​ ​change​ ​in​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​was​ ​the​ ​most​ ​significant​ ​factor​ ​observed​ ​here 
that​ ​changed​ ​between​ ​the​ ​Clinton​ ​and​ ​Obama​ ​attempts​ ​at​ ​improving​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Iran.​ ​Second, 
it​ ​may​ ​not​ ​be​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​have​ ​a​ ​high​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​interest.​ ​Most​ ​US​ ​businesses​ ​did 













some​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​policy​ ​decision-makers,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​not​ ​highly​ ​substantial.​ ​Levels​ ​of​ ​economic 
interest​ ​in​ ​Iran​ ​did​ ​not​ ​increase​ ​between​ ​the​ ​Clinton​ ​and​ ​Obama​ ​administrations,​ ​yet​ ​Obama 
negotiated​ ​and​ ​implemented​ ​nuclear​ ​nonproliferation​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​Iran.​ ​Therefore,​ ​at​ ​least​ ​in​ ​the 
case​ ​of​ ​Iran,​ ​change​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​may​ ​be​ ​a​ ​more​ ​significant​ ​factor​ ​than​ ​economic 
interests.  
However,​ ​Table​ ​2​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​when​ ​Iran​ ​and​ ​Vietnam​ ​are​ ​compared,​ ​the​ ​difference 
between​ ​a​ ​medium​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​perceived​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​and​ ​a​ ​high​ ​amount​ ​could​ ​be​ ​a 
determining​ ​factor​ ​for​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​rapprochement​ ​reaches​ ​full​ ​completion.​ ​These​ ​two​ ​cases 
did​ ​not ​ ​finish​ ​normalization​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​during​ ​the​ ​administration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​president​ ​who 
initiated​ ​rapprochement,​ ​but​ ​they​ ​experienced​ ​a​ ​second​ ​wave​ ​of​ ​policy​ ​change​ ​late​ ​in​ ​Obama’s 
presidency.​ ​International​ ​pressure​ ​increased​ ​in​ ​both​ ​of​ ​these​ ​cases,​ ​but​ ​only​ ​Vietnam​ ​saw​ ​full 
rapprochement. 
Table​ ​2: ​ ​Second​ ​Wave​ ​of​ ​Policy​ ​Change,​ ​Obama​ ​2014-2016 
Country 
Perceived​ ​economic 
interests International​ ​pressure 




Iran Medium High Yes No 
Vietnam High High Yes Yes 
 
It​ ​is​ ​surprising​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​not​ ​more​ ​similarities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​patterns​ ​of​ ​rapprochement 
between​ ​the​ ​Iran​ ​and​ ​Libya​ ​cases​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Vietnam​ ​and​ ​Cuba​ ​cases.​ ​Both​ ​Iran​ ​and​ ​Libya​ ​were 
hostile​ ​countries​ ​developing​ ​weapons​ ​of​ ​mass​ ​destruction​ ​and​ ​state​ ​sponsors​ ​of​ ​terrorism;​ ​they 
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transgressions​ ​and​ ​their​ ​statuses​ ​as​ ​major​ ​oil​ ​producers.​ ​However,​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US 
took​ ​a ​ ​significantly​ ​different​ ​path​ ​for​ ​each​ ​of​ ​them.​ ​This​ ​could​ ​be​ ​due​ ​to​ ​certain​ ​historical​ ​events, 
such​ ​as​ ​the ​ ​international​ ​community’s​ ​discovery​ ​of​ ​Libya’s​ ​supplier​ ​of​ ​WMD​ ​materials​ ​just​ ​two 
months​ ​before​ ​Libya​ ​renounced​ ​its​ ​WMD​ ​program.​ ​But​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​could​ ​also​ ​be​ ​due​ ​to 
different​ ​regime​ ​structures.​ ​Iranian​ ​president​ ​Khatami​ ​wanted​ ​to​ ​reform​ ​US-Iranian​ ​relations,​ ​but 
he​ ​faced ​ ​too​ ​much​ ​domestic​ ​political​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​do​ ​so​ ​and​ ​was​ ​not​ ​re-elected​ ​to​ ​the 
presidency.​ ​Libya,​ ​by​ ​contrast,​ ​was​ ​ruled​ ​by​ ​the​ ​dictator​ ​Gaddafi,​ ​who​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​make​ ​major 
foreign​ ​policy​ ​decisions,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​disarmament​ ​and​ ​renunciation​ ​of​ ​terrorism,​ ​without​ ​internal 
political​ ​repercussions.  
Similarly,​ ​the​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​Cuba​ ​and​ ​Vietnam​ ​share​ ​historical​ ​similarities​ ​but​ ​experienced 
rapprochement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​quite​ ​differently.​ ​For​ ​both​ ​countries,​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US​ ​were 
severed​ ​during​ ​the​ ​Cold​ ​War,​ ​and​ ​after​ ​the​ ​Cold​ ​War,​ ​US​ ​policies​ ​toward​ ​them​ ​was​ ​rather 
outdated​ ​but​ ​continued​ ​until​ ​significant​ ​economic​ ​interests​ ​pushed​ ​the​ ​US​ ​to​ ​reexamine​ ​these 
policies.​ ​Still,​ ​they​ ​are​ ​different;​ ​rapprochement​ ​began​ ​with​ ​Vietnam​ ​relatively​ ​soon​ ​after​ ​the 
Cold​ ​War​ ​ended​ ​without​ ​significant​ ​international​ ​pressure.​ ​At​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time​ ​the​ ​US​ ​was 
normalizing​ ​relations​ ​with​ ​Vietnam,​ ​however,​ ​the​ ​US​ ​decided​ ​to​ ​write​ ​Cold​ ​War-era​ ​sanctions 
on​ ​Cuba​ ​into​ ​law,​ ​moving​ ​even​ ​further​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​rapprochement​ ​and​ ​ignoring 
mounting​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​to​ ​change​ ​the​ ​policy​ ​for​ ​decades.​ ​These​ ​differences​ ​are​ ​likely 
due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Cuban-American​ ​lobby,​ ​which​ ​Vietnamese-Americans​ ​never​ ​matched. 
But​ ​they​ ​could​ ​also​ ​be​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​different​ ​roles​ ​these​ ​countries​ ​played​ ​in​ ​their​ ​relationships​ ​with 













resources,​ ​and​ ​for​ ​decades​ ​it​ ​was​ ​thought​ ​that​ ​Cuba​ ​would​ ​naturally​ ​become​ ​a​ ​state​ ​or​ ​territory​ ​of 
the​ ​United​ ​States.​ ​Ultimately,​ ​this​ ​discussion​ ​shows​ ​there​ ​are​ ​many​ ​more​ ​factors​ ​which​ ​can​ ​be 
evaluated​ ​when​ ​attempting​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​US:​ ​regime​ ​structures,​ ​regime 
changes,​ ​population​ ​demographics,​ ​and​ ​historical​ ​roles​ ​are​ ​only​ ​a​ ​few. 
The​ ​theoretical​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​these​ ​results​ ​are​ ​mixed.​ ​If​ ​perception​ ​of​ ​economic 
interests​ ​acts​ ​as​ ​a​ ​pressure​ ​on​ ​the​ ​actor-level​ ​analysis​ ​and​ ​international​ ​pressure​ ​represents 
structure-level​ ​analysis,​ ​than​ ​these​ ​results​ ​imply​ ​that​ ​both​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​analysis​ ​are​ ​necessary​ ​and 
work​ ​with ​ ​each​ ​other.​ ​Ultimately,​ ​more​ ​factors​ ​need​ ​to​ ​be​ ​examined​ ​to​ ​come​ ​to​ ​more​ ​specific 
and​ ​accurate​ ​explanations​ ​of​ ​US​ ​rapprochement.​ ​This​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​results​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study 
reinforces​ ​the​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​several​ ​constructivist​ ​scholars,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​more​ ​vague​ ​than​ ​what​ ​is 
preferable.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study​ ​for​ ​future​ ​rapprochement​ ​are​ ​more​ ​clear.​ ​If 
the​ ​US​ ​can​ ​ensure​ ​successful​ ​rapprochement​ ​with​ ​Iran,​ ​North​ ​Korea,​ ​or​ ​Russia,​ ​clear​ ​economic 
benefits​ ​for​ ​decision-makers​ ​and​ ​the​ ​American​ ​public​ ​should​ ​be​ ​present,​ ​and​ ​pressure​ ​from​ ​the 
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